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Article 
When Database Queries Are Fourth 
Amendment Searches 
Emily Berman† 
  INTRODUCTION   
As anyone familiar with Law & Order knows, the Fourth 
Amendment demands that—before conducting a search or sei-
zure—the government must secure a warrant. To be valid, the 
warrant must (1) be approved by a neutral decision-maker; (2) 
be based on a showing of probable cause; and (3) describe with 
particularity the places to be searched or the things to be 
seized.1 
Outside the world of police procedurals, however, the legal 
framework regulating the government’s investigative powers 
permits the collection of a great deal of information without 
abiding by prior approval, individualized cause,2 or particulari-
ty requirements. Specifically, investigators need not meet tra-
ditional warrant requirements in at least two types of situa-
tions—warrant requirement exceptions and what I call “Fourth 
Amendment exemptions.”3 When an exception to the warrant 
requirement applies, the government satisfies Fourth Amend-
ment demands merely by demonstrating that its actions are 
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the 2017 Michigan Young Scholars Conference, particularly Peter Margulies, 
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 1. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. 
 2. An “individualized suspicion” requirement demands that the govern-
ment show cause—usually probable cause or reasonable suspicion—to believe 
that a search of a particular individual is justified. United States v. Chandler, 
520 U.S. 305, 305–06 (1997). 
 3. See infra Part II.A.1. 
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reasonable.4 In Fourth Amendment exemptions, the govern-
ment’s collection activity does not violate a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy and therefore the Fourth Amendment does not 
regulate the collection at all.5 Such investigative activity is 
considered neither a search nor a seizure, and is thus exempt 
from constitutional limitations. Together, warrant requirement 
exceptions and Fourth Amendment exemptions permit the gov-
ernment to lawfully scoop up an enormous volume of infor-
mation about Americans, often without any reason to suspect 
any particular American of wrongdoing and with no demon-
strated connection to crime or specific intelligence needs. 
Moreover, there are no constitutional restrictions at all on 
how the government uses this vast expanse of data. So long as 
its collection is lawful, the Fourth Amendment has nothing to 
say about how information is employed.6 Rather, current con-
stitutional doctrine allows the government to combine, compile, 
and analyze any information in its possession—even as the 
volume of this information becomes ever larger and analytical 
tools ever more powerful.  
Courts and commentators recognize that the government’s 
broad collection authority raises significant privacy concerns. 
The conventional response is to suggest expanding the scope of 
collection regulation, either by narrowing warrant requirement 
exceptions7 or broadening the definition of what qualifies as a 
search or seizure.8 Thus existing doctrine and extant reform 
 
 4. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126–27 (2000) (discussing 
the court’s analysis of reasonable suspicion). 
 5. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy inquiry asks first whether the government has violated 
an expectation of privacy, and second, whether society is prepared to accept 
that expectation as reasonable. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also in-
fra notes 77–80 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra Part II.B. 
 7. E.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMIS-
SION (2017) (discussing policing reform in the United States). 
 8. The most common suggestion is to eliminate or constrain the third-
party doctrine, which exempts from Fourth Amendment protections any in-
formation voluntarily conveyed to a third party. See, e.g., Erin Murphy, The 
Case Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and 
Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1252–53 (2009) (arguing that the third-
party doctrine’s application should vary based on the voluntariness with which 
the records were shared); Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth 
Amendment “Papers” and the Third-Party Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 
247, 249–50 (2015) (arguing that the government should be required to obtain 
a warrant prior to seizing some third-party data); Daniel J. Solove, Digital 
Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1083, 1157 (2002) [hereinafter Solove, Digital Dossiers] (arguing that the 
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proposals both accept as given that the Fourth Amendment’s 
scope is limited to regulation of information collection. The pri-
vacy impact of large amounts of data, however, does not come 
solely from the sweeping nature of the government’s collection 
authority. The government’s postcollection use of information 
can—and often does—implicate privacy interests just as strong-
ly. 
This Article focuses on one form of information use with 
particularly troubling effects on privacy: database queries that 
implicate the aggregation problem.9 The aggregation problem, 
a label coined by Professor Daniel Solove, refers to the fact that 
the government can collect enough data—both in the sense of 
volume and of variety—that its aggregation and analysis can 
actually change the nature of the information, providing reve-
lations that could not have been gleaned from the isolated bits 
of information alone.10 At a certain point, the whole equals 
more than the sum of its parts. Yet because such aggregation 
necessarily takes place only after the information is collected, 
the extraction of such revelations is not subject to any constitu-
tional restrictions. I contend that when database queries about 
particular U.S. persons have the capacity to aggregate data 
such that it will reveal information that, in the absence of ag-
gregation, the government could only access by conducting a 
search or seizure, the extraction of that information should be 
subject to constitutionally based limits.11 In other words, when 
 
third-party doctrine should apply only to “systems of records”); see also Klay-
man v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 31 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded, 
800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (arguing that the third-party doctrine does not 
apply to bulk collection of telephony metadata). But see Orin S. Kerr, The Case 
for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009) (defending the 
third-party doctrine). 
 9. Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 8, at 1154. 
 10. Id.; Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 
514 (2006) [hereinafter Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy] (“Aggregation creates 
. . . a ‘digital person,’ a portrait composed of information fragments combined 
together.”); see also Joseph S. Fulda, Data Mining and Privacy, 11 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 105, 110 (2000) (noting that “two (conventional) data about an 
individual, each innocuous in itself ” can together “produce new (conventional) 
knowledge about the individual”). 
 11. Database queries about particular U.S. persons are distinct from what 
is commonly labeled data mining. See infra notes 157–58 and accompanying 
text. This Article’s analysis is limited to U.S. person queries and leaves dis-
cussion of Fourth Amendment limits on data mining to future work. Indeed, 
there is already a vibrant and quickly growing literature regarding the consti-
tutional implications of data mining. E.g., Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113 MICH. 
L. REV. 461 (2015) (discussing trends in policing technique); Andrew Guthrie 
Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. 
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a database query returns information that the government 
could otherwise collect only through a Fourth Amendment–
regulated means, the Fourth Amendment should regulate that 
query. If the government accesses an American’s electronic 
communications, for example, the same expectation of privacy 
is violated—the expectation that the government does not have 
access to our private communications in the absence of a court 
order12—regardless of whether the government collected those 
communications directly, pursuant to a warrant, or accessed 
them by querying a database in which communications collect-
ed incidentally to the targeting of a non-American are stored.13 
Note that the Constitution is triggered here by the nature of 
the information exposed by the query, not the nature of the in-
formation that makes up the underlying database(s).14  
The Fourth Amendment should regulate information use 
as well as its collection, I argue, because no modification to the 
collection rules will address threats to privacy that come solely 
from information use.15 The digital age has rendered collection-
focused efforts alone an insufficient means of preserving indi-
vidual privacy, particularly in light of the fact that the govern-
ment (1) is able to extract more information from the same data 
 
REV. 327, 329–30 (2015) (discussing current trends toward “big data” and 
away from “small data”); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and 
Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259, 265 (2012) (analyzing possible ef-
fect of data analysis on policing); Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big 
Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35 (2014); Erin Murphy, 
Databases, Doctrine & Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 803, 812 (2010) (discussing the impact of databases on law enforcement). 
 12. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (so hold-
ing in the intelligence context); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (so 
holding in the criminal context). 
 13. The reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test itself is generally recog-
nized to be unpredictable and largely circular. See infra notes 159–61 and ac-
companying text. But so long as Katz governs the question of what qualifies as 
a search, that is the relevant standard. Moreover, to the extent that queries 
expose knowledge, the collection of which is already definitively recognized as 
a search, the indeterminate nature of the Katz inquiry itself does not pose a 
problem. 
 14. Recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in a database search 
is concededly a significant expansion of Katz’s reasonable expectation of priva-
cy test, which to date has applied only to information collection. This expan-
sion, however, is no more significant than the expansion of Fourth Amend-
ment coverage that Katz itself represented at the time. See infra notes 187–93 
and accompanying text. 
 15. This is not to say that collection reforms are not also important. I 
agree, for example, that the third-party doctrine should be curtailed. The point 
here is simply that if the concern comes from how the government is using in-
formation, reforming collection rules cannot alleviate that concern entirely. 
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than it used to;16 and (2) that the costs of storage and analysis 
have plummeted.17  
Of course, the Constitution is not the only source of legal 
restrictions on government activity. Statutory, regulatory, poli-
cy-based, or judicially imposed constraints apply to use at 
times. Exactly what rules govern the collection and use of par-
ticular types of information vary, depending on both the nature 
of the data and the nature of the collection. When it comes to 
data regarding electronic communications, for example, non-
content data (or metadata)—like call records or email routing 
information—currently lacks constitutional protection.18 But 
that data is subject to statutory constraints on its collection.19 
The same is true for data such as financial and medical records. 
Even information that normally enjoys full Fourth Amendment 
protection under the warrant requirement, such as electronic 
communications, can sometimes be subject to a different re-
gime. Thus when collecting electronic communications by tar-
geting non-U.S. persons outside the United States for foreign 
intelligence purposes, which will inevitably collect the commu-
nications of U.S. persons as well—that collection need only be 
reasonable to satisfy the Constitution,20 while more specific 
regulation comes from other sources.21 A patchwork of limits 
from disparate sources regulates the vast sea of data unrelated 
 
 16. Blood collected at a crime scene, for example, historically could only 
allow law enforcement to determine its type. Now that same sample can pro-
vide a detailed genetic profile. Sophisticated analysis of large volumes of data 
has similarly magnified the volume of knowledge that can be extracted from 
information. See Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the 
Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317 (2008) (discussing the expansion of 
the government’s ability to analyze data about American citizens). 
 17. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (noting that technolog-
ical advances enable greater police surveillance). 
 18. See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production 
of Tangible Things from [REDACTED] 9 (FISA Ct., Aug. 29, 2013) (holding 
that collection of bulk telephony metadata is not regulated by the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 19. See 50 U.S.C. § 1842(h)(1) (2012) (instructing the Attorney General to 
develop “appropriate policies and procedures” for protecting the privacy of 
“nonpublicly available information concerning United States persons”); USA 
FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, §§ 201–202, 129 Stat. 268 (2015) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861) (prohibiting bulk collection and instituting pri-
vacy procedures). 
 20. In re Directives [REDACTED] Pursuant to Section 105b of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008). 
 21. See infra notes 107–11 and accompanying text (discussing the noncon-
stitutional limits on government use of Americans’ electronic communications 
captured in the courts of foreign intelligence surveillance). 
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to communications—social media postings; digital records of an 
individual’s movements; and public records such as arrests, re-
al estate purchases, or professional licenses.  
Some commentators argue that these unconstitutional 
rules are the appropriate means to regulate the government’s 
use of information.22 I disagree for a number of reasons.23 First, 
if limits on information collection are any guide, nonconstitu-
tional restrictions are often significantly less protective than 
Fourth Amendment–based regulation, frequently requiring on-
ly that the information is relevant to an ongoing investiga-
tion.24 Second, Congress has been an unreliable actor in this 
area, legislating piecemeal—often in response to some form of 
scandal—rather than developing a comprehensive information 
privacy regime.25 Similarly, internal or executive branch policy 
constraints generate a hodgepodge of rules, with different regu-
lations applicable to different agencies, any of which may be 
modified at any time and are frequently secret. These are not 
qualities that generate sustained, meaningful privacy protec-
tions. Finally, the government is now capable of uncovering 
many of our most intimate details—things that historically 
might have been discoverable only by searching someone’s “pa-
pers”26—simply by manipulating data. Fourth Amendment doc-
trine must evolve to recognize some database queries as 
searches just as it has evolved over time in other ways to ad-
 
 22. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Use Restrictions and the Future of Surveillance 
Law, in THE FUTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION 3 (2011) (advocating for regula-
tion of the entire surveillance process); William C. Banks, Programmatic Sur-
veillance and FISA: Of Needles and Haystacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1637 
(2010) (arguing for the development of a standardized system for authorized 
use of collected information); Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 10, at 
521–22 (describing a framework through which to understand privacy). But 
see, Ric Simmons, The Mirage of Use Restrictions, 96 N.C.L. REV. (forthcoming 
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2937809 (review-
ing use restrictions and discussing their justifications). 
 23. See infra Part III.C (discussing the need for constitutional regulation). 
 24. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Gov-
ernment, 75 MISS. L.J. 139, 149–67 (2005) (detailing the ease with which the 
government may collect call detail records, public records, medical records, 
credit information, stored communications, tangible things, and more); see also 
infra notes 251–52. 
 25. See infra notes 253–61 and accompanying text (discussing the insuffi-
ciency of legislative action). 
 26. The Fourth Amendment protects from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures of people’s “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” U.S. CONST. amend. 
IV. 
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dress challenges posed by new technology and new investiga-
tive techniques.27 
While my proposal would significantly expand the Fourth 
Amendment and may sound drastic, it is not as stark a diver-
gence from existing doctrine as it may first appear. Indeed, my 
doctrinal approach builds on two existing strands of Fourth 
Amendment law. The first is a series of what I call collection-
plus situations—circumstances in which collection is constitu-
tionally permissible only when paired with postcollection use 
restrictions.28 The Supreme Court has determined, for example, 
that foreign intelligence surveillance is consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment only when exercised in concert with “min-
imization procedures”—rules governing the government’s re-
tention and dissemination of the fruits of that surveillance.29 
Imposing constitutional constraints on information use alone—
as opposed to imposing them in conjunction with limits on par-
ticularly intrusive collection techniques—merely takes an addi-
tional step down that path.  
The other strand of Fourth Amendment law on which I 
draw comes from the Supreme Court’s recent efforts to grapple 
with the powerful effects of information aggregation. United 
States v. Jones examined the scope of the government’s author-
ity to engage in long-term warrantless GPS tracking. Black let-
ter Fourth Amendment law provides that information identify-
ing one’s location in a public space at any given moment is 
exempt from Fourth Amendment protection.30 In Jones, howev-
er, the Court faced the question whether aggregating infor-
mation about an individual’s precise location over the course of 
several weeks should lie similarly beyond the Constitution’s 
reach. In concurring opinions, five justices agreed that because 
such a “precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public 
movements” exposes “a wealth of detail about [that person’s] 
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associa-
tions,” it violates a reasonable expectation of privacy and 
should therefore be considered a search.31 In other words, the 
 
 27. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the 
Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011) (discussing how courts ad-
just Fourth Amendment doctrine in response to technology). 
 28. See infra notes 204–17 and accompanying text. 
 29. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972); 
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967). 
 30. See infra notes 93–96 and accompanying text. 
 31. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., con-
curring); see, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492 (2014) (rejecting 
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aggregation of many pieces of data was simply too intrusive to 
go unregulated, even though the collection of any one piece of 
that data—the defendant’s location at any given moment—
remained untouched by Fourth Amendment limits. When data-
base queries about U.S. persons similarly reveal intimate 
knowledge discoverable only by aggregating multiple pieces of 
data, courts should consider those queries Fourth Amendment 
searches, regardless of how the data were collected.  
Any objections to my proposal based on logistical concerns 
fail as well. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) 
has already provided a model for implementing these doctrinal 
changes in its own jurisprudence.32 As I have argued else-
where, the FISC imposed constraints in the form of minimiza-
tion procedures on the government’s Section 215 bulk telepho-
ny metadata program that approximated each of the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement’s elements.33 And while the 
FISC did not explicitly rest these restrictions on constitutional 
foundations, its means of imposing ex ante review, as well as 
cause and particularity requirements, nevertheless provides a 
blueprint for what a Fourth Amendment use-restriction regime 
might look like.  
This Article will proceed in three parts. Part I will first il-
lustrate the incredible breadth and volume of information the 
government may collect. It will then demonstrate the threat to 
privacy that the power to aggregate that data poses. Part II 
turns to Fourth Amendment doctrine, first explaining how war-
rant requirement exceptions and Fourth Amendment exemp-
tions remove much information collection from constraints tra-
ditionally applicable to searches and seizures and then 
exploring the powerful investigative tool this collection repre-
sents in light of the absence of use restrictions. In Part III, I 
will begin by making the case for treating as searches some da-
tabase queries about U.S. persons. I will then show how the 
FISC’s jurisprudence provides a model for how this doctrinal 
shift might be implemented. Finally, I will explain why we 
 
the warrantless search of an arrestee’s cell phone given the nature of the reve-
lations made possible by searching smartphone contents); see also Jones, 565 
U.S. at 419–31 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 32. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) is a federal court 
created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1801–1885(c) (2012) to review government applications to engage in domes-
tic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. Id. § 1803(d). 
 33. Emily Berman, Quasi-Constitutional Protections and Government 
Surveillance, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 771 (2016). 
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need constitutionally based use restrictions, rather than rely-
ing on statutory or regulatory rules. The Article will then brief-
ly conclude.  
I.  COLLECTION AND AGGREGATION OF INFORMATION   
This Part surveys the types of information the government 
collects about Americans and demonstrates that when the vol-
ume and variety of this information is combined with the gov-
ernment’s analytical capacity “it is possible to learn far more 
than most people had anticipated.”34 
A. THE INFORMATION THE GOVERNMENT CAN COLLECT35 
Most information the government collects does not impli-
cate the Fourth Amendment at all. Information regarding im-
migration, social security benefits, military service, census in-
formation, and income tax is collected and stored in the course 
of everyday operations. Other sources of information are gov-
ernment audits, agency oversight activities, personnel hiring, 
and more. Many of these records will include information such 
as an individual’s physical description, family history (marriag-
es, divorces, children), place of residence, political activity, fi-
nancial information, health care records (including medical 
conditions and use of prescription drugs), social security num-
ber, and beyond.36 Statutes and regulations—rather than con-
stitutional law—control government access to this type of in-
formation. 
Of course, intelligence and law enforcement operations also 
engage in their own major collection operations. We learned 
with great fanfare in 2013 from the Edward Snowden leaks 
that the National Security Agency (NSA) had been collecting 
since 2006, bulk telephony metadata records—comprised of in-
 
 34. John P. Holdren & Eric S. Lander, Letter to President Barack Obama, 
in BIG DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (2014). One hint 
at the volume of information involved comes from the NSA’s recent construc-
tion of a data storage facility roughly five times larger than the U.S. Capitol. 
James Bamford, The NSA Is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy Center (Watch 
What You Say), WIRED (Mar. 15, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/03/ff_ 
nsadatacenter. 
 35. As this path has been well-trodden by others, this discussion will pro-
vide a broad overview. For more detailed discussion about government infor-
mation collection, I commend to you the sources cited in notes 36–52, infra. 
 36. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy 
and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2002) [hereinafter Solove, 
Access and Aggregation]. 
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formation such the length of a call, the phone number from 
which the call was made, and the phone number dialed—
produced by each telephone company regarding “all telephone 
calls made through its systems or using its services where one 
or both ends of the call are located in the United States.”37 The 
revelation that, going back as far as 1987, the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA) had “routine access” to similar in-
formation regarding “every call that passes through an AT&T 
switch—not just those made by AT&T customers”—drew less 
attention.38 Call detail records are available to the government 
if they are “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal inves-
tigation.”39 Law enforcement entities regularly seek other in-
formation from communications providers as well, notably cell 
site location information.40 The Supreme Court granted certio-
 
 37. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 796 (2d Cir. 2015). “Metadata can al-
so reveal the user or device making or receiving a call through unique ‘identity 
numbers,’” as well as the routing of a call, which can indicate a caller ’s general 
location. Id. at 793–94; see also ADMIN. WHITE PAPER, BULK COLLECTION OF 
TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 3 
(2013) (explaining the government’s legal basis for an intelligence collection 
program). Defining the line between content and metadata in the context of 
electronic communications has proved less than straightforward. See, e.g., 
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that e-mails 
constitute communications content protected by the Fourth Amendment); 
United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that Internet 
Protocol addresses are noncontent metadata). 
 38. Scott Shane & Colin Moynihan, Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove, 
Eclipsing N.S.A.’s, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html. 
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). 
 40. Cell site location information (CSLI) is the compilation of data that 
cellular phones communicate with cell towers, conveying to cellular service 
providers details regarding the tower locations relied upon by users. According 
to AT&T, that company received 64,703 requests for such information in 2014; 
in the first half of 2015, Verizon received more than 21,000 such requests. 
Robinson Meyer, Do Police Need a Warrant To See Where a Phone Is?, ATLAN-
TIC (Aug. 8, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/08/ 
warrantless-cell-phone-location-tracking/400775. For readers familiar with the 
podcast Serial, you may recall that much of the government’s case against 
Adnan Syed for the 1999 murder of Hae Min Lee came from CSLI, and much 
of the uncertainty regarding his guilt or innocence comes from debate regard-
ing the accuracy and reliability of such records. See Season One, SERIAL, 
https://serialpodcast.org/season-one (last visited Nov. 5, 2017). For readers un-
familiar with Serial, do yourself a favor and listen to season one as soon as 
possible. Several circuits have determined that acquiring an individual’s his-
torical CSLI is not a search and therefore does not require a warrant. See, e.g., 
United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc); United 
States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Davis, 785 
F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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rari this Term to decide whether the warrantless collection of 
this kind of location information enjoys Fourth Amendment 
protection.41 
Police forces and the FBI have an insatiable desire for da-
ta, and deploy a variety of sophisticated information collection 
tools to acquire it: cell tower simulators,42 automatic license-
plate-recognition cameras—a technology designed to mark the 
location of a particular vehicle at a particular time43—and a 
variety of surveillance cameras mounted on aerial drones,44 in 
fixed locations, and on police cars and police officers.45 Sophis-
ticated means of conducting covert audio, video, and tracking 
surveillance are marketed to cities flush with counterterrorism 
funding.46 The New York Police Department (NYPD) has 
 
 41. Carpenter v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017). 
 42. See, e.g., Nicky Woolf, Stingray Documents Offer Rare Insight into Po-
lice and FBI Surveillance, GUARDIAN (Aug. 26, 2016), http://www.theguardian 
.com/us-news/2016/aug/26/stingray-oakland-police-fbi-surveillance (discussing 
the FBI’s use of cell site simulators). 
 43. See Cyrus Farivar, Your Car, Tracked: The Rapid Rise of License Plate 
Readers, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 27, 2012), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/ 
2012/09/your-car-tracked-the-rapid-rise-of-license-plate-readers; Richard 
Read, DEA Is Spying on Millions of U.S. Drivers with License Plate Readers, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/cars/dea-is 
-spying-on-millions-of-us-drivers-with-license-plate-readers/2015/01/27/ 
96cb42c6-a644-11e4-a162-121d06ca77f1_story.html. The International Associ-
ation of Chiefs of Police pointed out that automated license plate readers “may 
collect the license plate numbers of vehicles parked at locations that, even 
though public, might be considered sensitive, such as doctor ’s offices, clinics, 
churches, and addiction counseling meetings, among others.” INT’L ASS’N OF 
CHIEFS OF POLICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT REP. FOR THE UTILIZATION 
OF LICENSE PLATE READERS 21 (2009). 
 44. See Jack Gillum, et al., FBI Behind Mysterious Surveillance Aircraft 
Over U.S. Cities, PBS (June 2, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/ 
fbi-behind-mysterious-surveillance-aircraft-u-s-cities. 
 45. See, e.g., William M. Bulkeley, Chicago’s Camera Network Is Every-
where, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 17, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052748704538404574539910412824756 (noting Chicago’s police 
department links its 1500 cameras with thousands of other cameras deployed 
by other government agencies and the private sector); Mike Carter, Judge 
Blocks Seattle from Revealing Locations of FBI’s Hidden Cameras on Utility 
Poles, SEATTLE TIMES (June 13, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle 
-news/crime/judge-blocks-seattle-city-light-from-disclosing-locations-of-fbi 
-surveillance-cameras. 
 46. The tactical communications and surveillance catalog of British de-
fense contractor Cobham was recently made public. It describes covert audio, 
video, and tracking surveillance equipment available to law enforcement 
agencies. Product Quick Guide, COBHAM TACTICAL COMMC’NS & SURVEIL-
LANCE (Feb. 2014), https://www.cobham.com/media/1078613/Cobham_TCS_ 
QuickGuide_Mar14.pdf. 
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worked with Microsoft to develop what it calls domain aware-
ness system (DAS), which aggregates in real time various data 
from the city’s public surveillance cameras, arrest records, lists 
of completed crimes and their characteristics, vehicle tracking 
information collected from license plate readers, and more.47 
Moreover, agencies, at all levels of government, that collect da-
ta frequently share it both within the agency and externally to 
other government entities,48 though the terms of the use of that 
data often remain shrouded from public view.49  
The government also acquires a great deal of information 
from the private sector. Some private-sector information comes 
from data-collection firms, such as ChoicePoint and Acxiom, 
that compile data from public records from around the coun-
try—information about births, marriages, divorces, property 
transactions, professional licenses, arrests, court proceedings, 
and more—and combine it with information from other sources, 
such as private detectives, as well as social media websites, 
property records, public health data, car rentals, utility bills, 
insurance claims, postal records, purchase history from dis-
count and member-loyalty cards, and credit reporting firms, for 
sale to potential employers, landlords, and governments.50 A 
 
 47. Joh, supra note 11, at 48–49; Press Release, Office of the Mayor, 
Mayor Bloomberg, Police Commissioner Kelly and Microsoft Unveil New, 
State-of-the-Art Law Enforcement Technology That Aggregates and Analyzes 
Existing Public Safety Data in Real Time To Provide a Comprehensive View of 
Potential Threats and Criminal Activity (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www1.nyc 
.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/291-12/mayor-bloomberg-police-commissioner 
-kelly-microsoft-new-state-of-the-art-law. As of 2013, the NYPD had a data-
base of sixteen million license plates, along with the data regarding where 
they were captured. Id. Microsoft is also marketing this technology to other 
cities; New York City will receive thirty percent of the proceeds from future 
sales. Id. 
 48. See, e.g., RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
WHAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES WITH AMERICANS’ DATA 19–47 (2013), https:// 
www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Data%20Retention%20
-%20FINAL.pdf. 
 49. See, e.g., Larry Greenemeier, What Is the Big Secret Surrounding 
Stingray Surveillance?, SCI. AMERICAN (June 25, 2015), https://www 
.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-the-big-secret-surrounding-stingray 
-surveillance. 
 50. David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 
MINN. L. REV. 62, 142 (2013); Slobogin, supra note 16, at 320; Solove, Digital 
Dossiers, supra note 8, at 1151 (discussing government contracts with such 
private firms). This flow of information from the private sector grows ever 
larger as the government encourages the development of “new information-
gathering technologies.” See Id. at 1100. Information is big business. See Mur-
phy, supra note 11 at 805–10 (2010) (discussing the history and current capac-
ity of information databases); Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 8, at 1092 
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relatively new source of private-sector information is the Inter-
net of Things—devices connected to the Internet that send and 
receive information—which allows the makers of products to 
track and record how they are used. Everything from thermo-
stats to coffeemakers to baby monitors can be connected to the 
Internet, and information about those devices’ use can be cap-
tured in databases,51 the contents of which the government can 
then acquire.52 
Together, the information the government collects through 
routine activity, intelligence operations, law enforcement tools, 
and deals with private-sector data brokers a bewildering 
amount of information with little, if any, particularized basis.53 
To be sure, some of this data collection is valuable—necessary 
even. Imagine trying to redraw congressional districts without 
the census, or collecting taxes without information about indi-
viduals’ incomes. But this nonexhaustive list of the govern-
ment’s contemporary data-collection potential should convey 
the enormity of both its volume and its breadth.  
 
(“From credit reporting agencies, the government can glean information relat-
ing to financial transactions, debts, creditors, and checking accounts [as well 
as] details about people’s race, income, opinions, political beliefs, health, life-
style, and purchasing habits from database companies.”); id. at 1084 (“In the 
Information Age, an increasing amount of personal information is contained in 
records maintained by Internet Service Providers (ISPs), phone companies, 
cable companies, merchants, bookstores, websites, hotels, landlords, employers 
and private sector entities.”). For evidence that information truly is big busi-
ness, note that at one point ChoicePoint was valued at $3.6 billion. Reed Else-
vier To Acquire ChoicePoint for $3.6 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/21/technology/21iht-reed.4.10279549.html. 
 51. Bernard Marr, Google’s Nest: Big Data and the Internet of Things in 
the Connected Home, FORBES (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
bernardmarr/2015/08/05/googles-nest-big-data-and-the-internet-of-things-in 
-the-connected-home/#6eb45273bac4. 
 52. See Trevor Timm, The Government Just Admitted It Will Use Smart 
Home Devices for Spying, GUARDIAN (Feb 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian 
.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/09/internet-of-things-smart-devices-spying 
-surveillance-us-government. The same holds true for anything that conveys 
information about your movements and your purchases, such as items that 
contain a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag, which can include your 
passport, your credit card, your supermarket loyalty card, even the clothes 
that you wear. See Miguel Bustillo, Wal-Mart Radio Tags To Track Clothing, 
WALL ST. J., July 23, 2010, at A1; Alejandro Martınez-Cabrera, Concern over 
Privacy As ID Tags’ Use Expands, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 6, 2010, at D1 (reporting 
that a California county implanted RFID tags in preschoolers’ uniforms). 
 53. See Joh, supra note 11, at 39 (noting that ninety percent of the world’s 
data has been generated in the past two years, and that we now create as 
much information in two days as we did from the beginning of human civiliza-
tion until 2003). 
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B. THE AGGREGATION PROBLEM 
Though the volume and variety of information to which the 
government has access raises its own questions, my primary 
concern is what the combination (aggregation) of so much in-
formation enables the government to discover. Analysis can de-
rive from data that private information, “at the time of their 
collection, seemed to raise no, or only manageable, privacy is-
sues.”54 Professor Solove has called this phenomenon the ag-
gregation problem.55 When seen “in isolation, each piece of our 
day-to-day information is not all that telling; viewed in combi-
nation, it begins to paint a portrait about” us.56 The upshot is 
 
 54. PRES.’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., BIG DATA AND PRIVA-
CY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE at ix (2014), https://obamawhitehouse 
.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_data_and_ 
privacy_-_may_2014.pdf [hereinafter PCAST]. 
 55. Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 36, at 1185; see also Jack 
M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 1, 12 (2008) (noting that technologies allow the government “to record 
perfectly innocent behavior that no one is particularly ashamed of and draw 
from that data surprisingly powerful inferences about people’s behavior, be-
liefs, and attitudes”); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Pro-
cess: Toward a Framework To Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. 
Rev. 93, 106 (2014) (“[O]ne cannot assess the predictive privacy risks from the 
collection of a single data point.”); Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. 
Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 773, 826 (2015) (discussing how 
a fusion of locational-body surveillance and biographical-behavioral surveil-
lance allows the government to enable tracking and data analytics on poten-
tial suspects and/or terrorists); Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 8, at 1154 
(“A fact here or there may seem innocuous but when combined, they become 
more telling about that person.”).  
The aggregation problem is related to, but is distinct from, what has been 
labeled mosaic theory, which posits that “a series of acts that are not searches 
in isolation amount to a search when considered as a group.” See Orin S. Kerr, 
The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 320 
(2012). The idea is that multiple nonsearches combined together may amount 
to a search because of the mosaic they reveal. Id. The quintessential example 
is the long-term surveillance of an individual’s public movements—combining 
a sufficient number of location data points over a sufficient period of time will 
reveal a great deal of information about the surveillance target’s life. While 
the mosaic theory describes one form of aggregation—the aggregation of in-
formation resulting from a series of government collection activities—it is fo-
cused on determining when a sequence of government acts constitutes a 
search. By contrast, I do not argue that a series of nonsearches becomes a 
search when a certain threshold is crossed. Instead, I argue that the single act 
of querying a database can itself be a search. See infra notes 221–24 and ac-
companying text. 
 56. Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 36, at 1185; see also 
PCAST, supra note 54, at x (noting that aggregating data “can result in the 
identification of individual people, the creation of profiles of an individual, and 
the tracking of an individual’s activities”). 
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that when government officials search—or query—aggregated 
information, they can learn a great deal more about the subject 
of the query than they could have done using any individual 
piece of data alone. Importantly, the additional information da-
ta aggregation provides may be “precisely the same information 
[the government] previously would have been required to ob-
tain a warrant to access,” thereby undermining existing privacy 
protections.57 
Think of the aggregation problem as the difference between 
explicit and implicit knowledge.58 Explicit knowledge is infor-
mation that is plain on the face of data. Implicit knowledge is 
information that can be extracted through data analysis.59 
Consider the following hypothetical. Jane’s neighbor (or the li-
cense plate reader in her neighborhood) knows that, beginning 
two months ago, she started leaving for work one hour earlier 
on Thursday mornings than on other workdays; the grocery 
store clerk (or the grocery store’s member-loyalty program) 
knows that over that same time frame, Jane has eaten a pint of 
coffee ice cream every week; and the barista at a coffee shop on 
the other side of town (or the coffee shop’s frequent-customer 
program) knows that she recently became a Thursday morning 
regular.  
Standing alone, each of these disclosures reveals only a 
small amount of information about Jane, none of which is par-
ticularly sensitive. But imagine that each of these facts was 
digitally stored in a government database, which investigators 
 
 57. TECH. & PRIVACY ADVISORY COMM., U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, SAFE-
GUARDING PRIVACY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 36 (2004), https:// 
www.cdt.org/files/security/usapatriot/20040300tapac.pdf. 
 58. K.A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots 
To Make Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 3, 37 (2003). 
Extracting implicit information means that the results of data mining 
are not existing data items in the database. Traditional information 
retrieval from a database returns arrays consisting of data from indi-
vidual fields of records (or entire records) from the database in re-
sponse to a defined or specified database query. The results of the 
traditional database query are explicit in the database, that is, the 
answer returned to a query is itself a data item (or an array of many 
items) in the database. Data mining techniques, however, extract 
knowledge from the database that is implicit—knowledge that typi-
cally does not exist a priori is revealed. 
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 59. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (noting that momentary location information is not particularly 
revealing, but aggregating location information can generate “a precise, com-
prehensive record” of a person’s life, reflecting “a wealth of detail about her 
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations”). 
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can then query for all of the information it contains about Jane. 
The results of that query could easily lead to the conclusion 
(whether correct or incorrect) that something in Jane’s life 
changed two months ago and that she now has a weekly 
Thursday morning appointment somewhere near a particular 
coffee shop. Further investigation into this Thursday morning 
activity could reveal regular trips to a psychiatrist, a fertility 
clinic, a substance abuse rehabilitation center, or any number 
of other intensely personal activities that neither a neighbor 
nor a barista could divine with the isolated bits of information 
available to them. In other words, querying a database com-
piled from disparate sources “reveals facts about data subjects 
in ways far beyond anything they expected” based on what they 
have revealed publicly.60 The whole is more than the sum of its 
parts. 
The threat posed by aggregation is not limited to hypothet-
icals. The NSA’s post-9/11 surveillance programs illustrate the 
aggregation problem’s implications. The now-discontinued Sec-
tion 215 bulk telephone metadata surveillance program (named 
after the relevant statutory provision of the USA PATRIOT 
Act)61 involved collecting and aggregating all of Americans’ te-
lephony metadata, thereby compiling an enormous volume of 
Americans’ telephone communications records.62 Government 
analysts could then query that database using a seed identifier, 
basically a search term (here, usually a phone number), to ex-
tract information regarding a particular individual.63 A query 
yields “phone numbers, and the metadata associated with 
 
 60. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 10, at 508; Solove, Access 
and Aggregation, supra note 36, at 1178 (“We know that our lives will remain 
private not in the sense that the information will be completely shielded from 
public access, but . . . because it is a needle in a haystack, and usually nobody 
will take the time to try to find it.”). 
 61. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 
277–78 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)) (permitting 
the FBI to “make an application for an order requiring the production of any 
tangible things . . . for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence infor-
mation . . . or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelli-
gence activities”). The USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 eliminated the use of Sec-
tion 215 for bulk collection. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 
129 Stat. 268 (2015) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861). 
 62. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELE-
PHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PA-
TRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SUR-
VEILLANCE COURT 8 (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/215-report_on_the_ 
telephone_records_program.pdf [hereinafter PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT]. 
 63. Id. at 26–31. 
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them, that have been in contact with the seed.”64 At that point, 
the government can then search for the numbers and associat-
ed metadata that have been in contact with the numbers the 
first query returns.65 So rather than simply getting the list of 
numbers with which the seed is in contact, the aggregation of 
all metadata allows the government to map the entire commu-
nications network of the seed number.66 Even conceding for the 
sake of argument that the collection of a single, targeted indi-
vidual’s phone records does not raise privacy concerns,67 the 
capabilities exercised in the Section 215 metadata program 
might give us pause. Indeed, it gave the American public pause 
when it came to light.68 
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) Amendments Act provides an even more troubling illus-
tration, as that program authorizes the government to collect 
communications content,69 which the Constitution has always 
treated as one of the most intrusive forms of surveillance.70 The 
program collects the electronic communications into and out of 
the United States of a target “reasonably believed to be located 
outside the United States.”71 Electronic communications in-
 
 64. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 797 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 65. Id.; PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 62, at 29 (“[Investigators 
are] able to view the records of calls involving telephone numbers that had 
contact with a telephone number that had contact with the original target.”). 
 66. Identifying unknown targets through scrutiny of an individual’s social 
networks is known as link analysis. Statement of Nathan A. Sales, Asst. Prof., 
George Mason Sch. of Law, PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., 
WORKSHOP REGARDING SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS OPERATED PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT & SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN IN-
TELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 2 (July 9, 2013). 
 67. This is the current state of the law according to the third-party doc-
trine. See infra notes 81–92 and accompanying text (discussing the third-party 
doctrine). 
 68. After the Section 215 program became public in 2013, President 
Obama slightly curtailed its scope; the USA FREEDOM ACT of 2015 then en-
acted several modifications, including a bar on bulk collection. See Jennifer 
Steinhauer & Jonathan Weisman, U.S. Surveillance in Place Since 9/11 Is 
Sharply Limited, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
06/03/us/politics/senate-surveillance-bill-passes-hurdle-but-showdown-looms 
.html. 
 69. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012). Contrast this to the Section 215 program, 
which collected only metadata, which traditionally enjoys much less constitu-
tional protection than content. 
 70. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (distinguishing 
a prior case which acquired the contents of a phone conversation from acquir-
ing the number dialed). 
 71. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2). Upon discovery that “a Section 702 target is a 
U.S. person or was inside the United States at the time of targeting, the gov-
 594 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:577 
 
cludes the contents of phone calls and email, as well as instant 
messages, Facebook messages, web browsing history, and 
Skype conversations.72 And while the government may neither 
target a U.S. person nor target a foreigner for the purpose of 
acquiring a particular U.S. person’s communications, commu-
nications collected under this program necessarily include 
someone in the U.S.73 This results, of course, in the collection of 
“a significant amount of information about U.S. persons.”74 An-
alysts may then query the database of Section 702–acquired in-
formation using a seed associated with a U.S. person, thus ac-
cessing any conversation that a particular U.S. person had with 
an overseas target. 
The aggregation problem arises outside the foreign intelli-
gence context as well. As Justice Sonia Sotomayor eloquently 
made plain in her concurrence in United States v. Jones, aggre-
gating information about an individual’s location over a sub-
stantial period of time generates “a wealth of detail about her 
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associa-
tions.”75 Investigators can extract location information by ag-
gregating sufficiently extensive networks of cell tower simula-
 
ernment must stop the collection immediately,” but is permitted to “waive” the 
general requirement that such communications must be destroyed. PRIVACY & 
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 
OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SUR-
VEILLANCE ACT 127 (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-report.pdf [here-
inafter PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT]. 
 72. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of Interna-
tional Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117, 120 
(2015). 
 73. PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT, supra note 71, at 127–33. 
 74. Id. at 133; see also Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism 
Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN (June 7, 
2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data. 
 75. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., con-
curring). Similar information could be acquired by collecting CSLI in bulk. For 
a discussion of CSLI, see supra note 40. To date, no government agency has 
tried to acquire a comprehensive database of all CSLI (as far as I am aware), 
but a sufficient number of cell tower simulators deployed across a particular 
geographical area, would provide the same data. A query of a widely distribut-
ed network of automatic license plate readers (ALPR) fed into a single data-
base regarding a particular individual’s vehicle—a criminal suspect, an ex-
girlfriend—would also return a map of that individual’s movements. In a 2011 
survey by the Police Executive Research Forum, seventy-one percent of re-
sponding agencies used ALPRs and eighty-five percent planned to acquire or 
increase their use over the next five years. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, 
HOW ARE INNOVATIONS IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFORMING POLICING? 31 (2012), 
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/how%20are%20 
innovations%20in%20technology%20transforming%20policing%202012.pdf. 
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tors, surveillance cameras, automatic license plate reader 
(ALPR) technology, biometric information, or databases with 
records from companies such as E-Z pass, Travelocity, or Ho-
tels.com.76  
You might wonder why we should be concerned about the 
information that the government collects and the kind of con-
clusions it can draw from aggregating and searching that in-
formation. After all, doesn’t the Fourth Amendment protect our 
privacy? Wouldn’t the Constitution bar the government’s access 
to truly private information absent probable cause to believe 
criminal activity is afoot? As the next Part will make plain, the 
answer to both of these questions is an emphatic no.  
II.  FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW’S FAILURE   
To fall within the Fourth Amendment’s ambit, government 
action must qualify as a search or seizure. The current regime 
defining searches for Fourth Amendment purposes began in 
1967, with Katz v. United States.77 In Katz, the Supreme Court 
rejected the idea that the Fourth Amendment regulates only 
physical trespasses by government officials, holding that it pro-
tects “people, not places.”78 As a result, collecting the contents 
of a phone call made from a public telephone booth qualified as 
a search requiring a warrant.79 Since Katz, the Fourth 
Amendment has regulated any government activity that vio-
lates an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.80  
Such activity constitutes a search and must comply with 
constitutional limits. Usually those limits require the govern-
ment to secure a warrant from a neutral magistrate based upon 
probable cause.  
As Section A demonstrates, however, under contemporary 
doctrine, a great deal of information collection does not violate 
a reasonable expectation of privacy; even when it does, an ex-
ception to the warrant requirement often applies. Moreover, 
 
 76. The FBI’s database of biometric information includes millions of pho-
tographs. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FACE RECOGNITION TECHNOL-
OGY: FBI SHOULD BETTER ENSURE PRIVACY AND ACCURACY 10 (2016), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677098.pdf. This database is used by both fed-
eral and state investigators. Id. at 11. 
 77. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Prior to Katz, the Fourth Amendment regulated 
government activity that physically invaded protected spaces, like houses or 
offices. Id. at 352–53. 
 78. Id. at 351. 
 79. Id. at 353. 
 80. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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the absence of constitutional limits regarding the government’s 
use of that information, as Section B will explain, magnifies 
any concerns raised by the dearth of Fourth Amendment limits 
on collection. Section C will then demonstrate how recent Su-
preme Court cases reveal the tension that the power of infor-
mation aggregation is currently creating within Fourth 
Amendment doctrine.  
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S PERMISSIVE INFORMATION 
COLLECTION RULES  
This Section discusses two circumstances in which the 
warrant requirement does not apply. First, what I call Fourth 
Amendment exemptions refer to instances in which the collec-
tion at issue does not qualify as a search or seizure. The Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of Katz’s reasonable-expectation-
of-privacy test places an enormous amount of information—
some of it highly sensitive—in this category. Second, I refer to 
instances where the Fourth Amendment applies but the gov-
ernment need not secure a warrant as warrant requirement ex-
ceptions. In those circumstances, the government action must 
merely be reasonable, a determination courts make by balanc-
ing the government’s interest in collection against the intru-
siveness of the search or seizure. This Section will show how 
these exemptions and exceptions often swallow the Fourth 
Amendment rule. 
Three preliminary points are in order. First, this Section 
does not provide an exhaustive catalog of Fourth Amendment 
exceptions and exemptions. It should, however, illustrate the 
permissiveness of the overall regime. Second, in this Article I 
take no position in the heated, long-running debate regarding 
the appropriate scope of existing exemptions and exceptions. 
Instead, I simply expound existing doctrine. Third, I recognize 
that the collection of information that enjoys no Fourth 
Amendment protection may nevertheless be subject to statuto-
ry or regulatory limits. As I explain in Part III, infra, I find 
those types of limits unsatisfactory as a general matter; moreo-
ver, even with the most stringent collection rules, the aggrega-
tion problem would still present a privacy threat. 
1. Fourth Amendment Exemptions 
Of the numerous Fourth Amendment exemptions, those re-
sponsible for most of the investigative activity relevant to the 
aggregation problem come from one of two doctrines. First is 
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the third-party doctrine, by far the most significant Fourth 
Amendment exemption.81 The doctrine provides that any in-
formation we voluntarily reveal to a third party—a term en-
compassing any individual or nongovernmental institution—
enjoys no Fourth Amendment protection.82 In Smith v. Mary-
land, one of the doctrine’s foundational cases, the Supreme 
Court held that law enforcement’s collection of the list of phone 
numbers that a criminal suspect dialed did not constitute a 
search because the suspect should have reasonably expected 
that his telecommunications provider kept track of such infor-
mation and he had therefore voluntarily relinquished it.83 By 
relinquishing this information to another, the doctrine reasons, 
one cedes any reasonable expectation of privacy in it.84  
Consider what is included in this category of information: 
phone records identifying who you associate with; bank records 
showing who you do business with; credit card records reveal-
ing where you eat, shop, and seek entertainment; medical rec-
ords listing your prescriptions; the records of cable companies 
and video-streaming services exposing what you watch; Inter-
net browsing history indicating whether you have searched for 
symptoms of disease or investigated substance abuse treatment 
options; and travel records from airlines, hotels, rental car 
companies, or other third parties like Orbitz or Kayak.85 The 
third-party doctrine also denies Fourth Amendment protections 
to information that private firms gather from your applianc-
es.86 
 
 81. The third-party doctrine has never been well loved by commentators, 
and members of the academy continue to produce suggestions to eliminate or 
modify it. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 8, at 563–64 nn.5–11 (compiling a list of 
critiques of third-party doctrine); Peter P. Swire, Katz Is Dead. Long Live 
Katz., 102 MICH. L. REV. 904 (2004); see also sources cited supra note 8. 
 82. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 
425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 83. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 743–45. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 8, at 1090–91. 
 86. Id. A particularly aggressive interpretation of the third-party doctrine 
was also used to justify the NSA’s warrantless bulk collection of telephone 
metadata. Under that program, rather than simply collecting the call records 
of a particular individual, as it had done in Smith, the government collected 
all of the telephony metadata recorded by communications providers of all 
calls made through their system where one or both ends of the communication 
were in the United States. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 795–99 (2d Cir. 
2015); see also supra notes 70–85 and accompanying text, infra notes 87–110 
and accompanying text. And, because both the government and the FISC 
agreed that telephone metadata qualified as third-party records that are not 
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To be sure, some of the data subject to collection under the 
third-party doctrine is subject to statutory or policy-based 
rules. To collect an individual’s communications metadata un-
der Section 215, for example, the government must certify that 
the “information likely to be obtained” is “relevant to an ongo-
ing investigation to protect against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities.”87 And the Attorney General 
must “include privacy protections that apply to the collection, 
retention, and use of information concerning United States per-
sons.”88 Medical records also enjoy statutory protection.89 But 
as privacy scholars have demonstrated repeatedly, the existing 
legal framework for protecting individual privacy is, on the 
whole, outdated and incomplete.90 
Note that the principle behind the third-party doctrine—
the idea that anything you have voluntarily provided to a third 
party lacks Fourth Amendment protection—is not limited to 
written records. The third-party doctrine’s close cousin, some-
times referred to as the “false friend” doctrine, applies the same 
idea to spoken conversations.91 There is no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in what someone voluntarily tells an interlocu-
tor, even if—unbeknownst to the speaker—she happens to be a 
government agent or informant.92 This doctrine allows law en-
forcement or intelligence officials to attend and record (or task 
informants to attend and record) religious or political gather-
 
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection, the government was able to assem-
ble a vast database made up of an enormous volume of Americans’ telephone 
communications records, both domestic and international, with no constitu-
tionally imposed limits. Amended Memorandum Opinion at 3, In re Applica-
tion of FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [RE-
DACTED], No. BR 13-109 (FISA Ct., Aug. 29, 2013). 
 87. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (2012). Metadata collected in the criminal con-
text must be “relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3122(b)(2) (2012). 
 88. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(h)(1). 
 89. Slobogin, supra note 24, at 158. 
 90. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, A User ’s Guide to the Stored Communications 
Act, and a Legislator ’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 
1233 (2004) (noting that one particular privacy statute is “vague in some plac-
es, overly complex in others, and underprotective of privacy interests in oth-
ers”); Slobogin, supra note 24, at 149–67 (describing limited privacy protec-
tions for information other than communications content); Daniel J. Solove & 
Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 357, 364–68 (2006) (describing the “limits of U.S. privacy law”); see 
sources cited infra notes 251–52. 
 91. Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 
MISS. L.J. 1309, 1326 (2012). 
 92. E.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 296 (1966). 
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ings as well as individual conversations. 
While the third-party doctrine is the most noteworthy 
Fourth Amendment exemption, another is also quite signifi-
cant. The Supreme Court held in Knotts v. United States that 
when government officials collect information about one’s phys-
ical location in a public place—even if aided by an electronic 
tracking device—that collection is neither a search nor a sei-
zure.93 The Court reasoned that people “traveling in an auto-
mobile on public thoroughfares” voluntarily convey the details 
of their travels “to anyone who want[s] to look.”94 Under a 
broad reading of Knotts, the government could argue that the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply to any location-tracking 
method so long as the government has not trespassed on pri-
vate property to collect the information.95 Cell site location in-
formation (CSLI) gathered through the use of a cell tower simu-
lator or from a communications provider,96 video surveillance 
paired with facial-recognition software, toll records, or license 
plate readers all can be viewed simply as a means of collecting 
location information. So long as the resulting data is limited to 
locations in public places, Knotts arguably permits such acqui-
sition as merely the gathering of information voluntarily di-
vulged to the public at large. Regulations addressing these 
forms of collection, if they exist, vary from jurisdiction to juris-
diction.97 
2. Warrant Requirement Exceptions 
In circumstances where the Fourth Amendment applies 
but the warrant requirement does not, the traditional limits of 
ex ante review, probable cause, and particularity become fall 
away. In these cases, the Fourth Amendment merely requires 
that, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, the 
government search or seizure is “reasonable.” Courts determine 
 
 93. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983); see also United 
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (holding that the use of a beeper to track a 
person’s location was not a search under the Fourth Amendment until the 
beeper entered a home). 
 94. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82; cf. Karo, 468 U.S. at 731–32 (holding that 
the Fourth Amendment is only violated by the warrantless location search of a 
container at the moment it enters a private home). 
 95. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 414 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
 96. For information on CSLI’s constitutional status, see discussion supra 
note 40. 
 97. Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 90, at 380–82. 
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whether government action is reasonable by balancing the gov-
ernment’s interest against the intrusiveness of the search; rea-
sonableness sometimes, but not always, requires individualized 
suspicion.98  
The most important warrant requirement exception for the 
purposes of this Article is the foreign-intelligence-surveillance 
exception.99 Under this exception, the government need not se-
cure a warrant to collect information with foreign intelligence 
value.100 In In re Directives, the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court of Review (FISCR)101 held that, “a foreign intelli-
gence exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant require-
ment exists when surveillance is conducted to obtain foreign 
intelligence for national security purposes and is directed 
against [targets] reasonably believed to be located outside the 
United States.”102 The FISCR also found the surveillance pro-
 
 98. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding stop-and-frisk 
searches permissible with reasonable suspicion that the person is “armed and 
presently dangerous”); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–300 (1967) (cre-
ating an “exigent circumstances exception” to the warrant requirement for 
home searches); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (allowing 
for warrantless search of vehicles with reasonable suspicion of crime); see also 
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393–95 (1985) (extending vehicle exception 
to mobile homes in certain circumstances). 
 99. The foreign intelligence surveillance exception is actually just one ap-
plication of a broader warrant requirement exception known as the special 
needs doctrine. That doctrine provides that a warrantless search may be justi-
fied when special needs, “beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” make 
the warrant and probable-cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment im-
practicable. E.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring). Under this rationale, the Supreme Court has approved as con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment: (1) the U.S. Customs’ Service’s mandato-
ry drug testing of employees seeking promotion to positions involving interdic-
tion of illegal drugs, requiring them to carry firearms, or requiring them to 
handle classified materials; (2) a school district’s random drug testing for stu-
dent athletes; (3) the search of a probationer ’s home; and (4) numerous other 
contexts. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Nat’l Treasury 
Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 
483 U.S. 868, 873, 875 (1987). See also Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 
v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (holding that individualized suspicion is not re-
quired to justify random drug testing of students involved in extracurricular 
activities); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (holding 
that warrantless drug and alcohol tests for railway employees were reasonable 
even in the absence of reasonable suspicion that any particular employee was 
impaired). 
 100. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336. 
 101. FISA created a Court of Review (FISCR), made up of three federal dis-
trict or appeals court judges appointed by the Chief Justice, to hear appeals 
from decisions of the FISC. 50 U.S.C § 1803 (2012). 
 102. In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004, 1012 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008). In re Direc-
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gram as a whole reasonable and therefore lawful under the 
Fourth Amendment.103  
This case gave a green light to the Section 702 program’s 
collection of non-U.S. persons’ electronic communications, so 
long as the target is “reasonably believed to be located outside 
the United States.”104 If the government directly targeted U.S. 
persons for their international electronic communications, such 
surveillance would indisputably require individualized proba-
ble cause.105 Yet because the program both qualifies for the for-
eign-intelligence-surveillance exception to the warrant re-
quirement and has been deemed reasonable by the FISCR, the 
Fourth Amendment poses no obstacle to this collection—even 
in the absence of individualized suspicion about the overseas 
target’s American interlocutors.106  
As with communications metadata, Section 702 collection 
and the use of the resulting data are subject to some statutory, 
policy-based, and judicially imposed limits.107 For example, a 
“significant purpose” of the collection must be to gather foreign 
intelligence information—a relatively expansive category108—
 
tives involved a challenge to the temporary Protect America Act (PAA), Pub. L. 
No. 110-55, § 105B, 121 Stat. 552 (2007). The PAA was replaced in 2008 by the 
FISA Amendments Act (FAA), Pub. L. No. 110-261 (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1881a–g). 
 103. In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1012–15. The FISCR held that the sur-
veillance met the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement in light of 
the government’s interest in protecting national security and the “matrix of 
safeguards” that mitigated the intrusiveness of the program. Id. 
 104. Id. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2). 
 105. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972); 
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1805. 
 106. In re Directives implied that an executive order requiring the Attorney 
General to have probable cause to believe that the targeted person is a foreign 
power or its agent was one of several constitutionally compelled procedural 
protections. In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1014. 
 107. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861, 1881a; ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., ATT’Y GEN. 
OF U.S., PROCEDURES USED BY THE NSA FOR TARGETING NON-UNITED STATES 
PERSONS REASONABLY BELIEVED TO BE LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED 
STATES (2009) (detailing NSA targeting procedures); Berman, supra note 33, 
at 806–17 (detailing the judicially imposed limits on Section 215 and Section 
702 data); Peter Margulies, Reauthorizing the FISA Amendments Act: A Blue-
print for Enhancing Privacy Protections and Preserving Foreign Intelligence 
Capabilities, 12 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 23, 37–39 (2016) (describing judicially and 
executive-branch-imposed limits on data collection). 
 108. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e). A target of Section 702 surveillance “could be 
completely innocent.” Hearing on Oversight and Reauthorization of the FISA 
Amendments Act: The Balance Between National Security, Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 7 (2016) (state-
ment of David Medine, Chairman, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
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but it need not be the only purpose.109 Indeed the primary pur-
pose of the collection could be something totally unrelated—
such as a criminal investigation.110 And while queries of the 
Section 702–acquired information are themselves subject to 
rules developed in conjunction with the FISA,111 those rules do 
not prevent the most troubling practice (from a Fourth 
Amendment perspective, anyway): analysts may perform so-
called U.S. person queries, which ask for communications in-
volving a particular U.S. person. Such a query returns all in-
ternational communications that U.S. person engaged in with 
any overseas target, regardless of its foreign intelligence val-
ue.112 This occurs despite the statute barring the targeting of 
U.S. persons for collection.113  
Other courts have relied on the foreign-intelligence-
surveillance exception to bless the warrantless search of a U.S. 
citizen’s home in Kenya114 as well as New York City’s suspi-
cionless searches of individuals riding the subway.115 The list of 
warrant requirement exceptions is long—it includes searches or 
seizures of items in plain view, border searches,116 inventory 
searches, consent searches, and more.117 
 
Board). For an argument that a broad definition of “foreign intelligence infor-
mation” is necessary to successful diplomacy, see Peter Margulies, Defining 
“Foreign Affairs” in Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act: The Virtues and 
Deficits of Post-Snowden Dialogue on U.S. Surveillance Policy, 72 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1283, 1283–87 (2015). 
 109. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(v). 
 110. The NSA determines who will be targeted, but the FBI may “nomi-
nate” targets. PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT, supra note 71, at 47. 
 111. See NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, U.S. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE, US-
SID SP0018, LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND U.S. PERSONS MINIMIZATION PROCE-
DURES § 4 (2011); NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY 
THE NSA IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN-
FORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SUR-
VEILLANCE ACT § 3 (2007); William C. Banks, Next Generation Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Law: Renewing 702, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 671, 672–88 (2017) 
(detailing nonconstitutional limits on Section 702 data collection and use). 
 112. In 2016, the government (not including the FBI, which is exempt from 
reporting requirements) used 5288 search terms associated with a U.S. per-
son. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATISTICAL TRANSPARENCY 
REPORT REGARDING USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES FOR CALENDAR 
YEAR 2016, at 8 (2017). 
 113. In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004, 1012–15 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008). 
 114. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 93 (2d 
Cir. 2008). 
 115. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006) (permitting application 
of the special needs exception to a warrantless search where the subject of a 
search possesses a full privacy expectation). 
 116. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (finding that 
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This brief discussion of a couple of those exceptions, how-
ever, shows that the default Fourth Amendment rule requiring 
a showing of probable cause, identification of the object of the 
search or seizure with particularity, and ex ante approval by a 
neutral magistrate does not always apply. In fact, there are 
many circumstances in which the government constitutionally 
may collect large swaths of information about Americans with-
out satisfying one or more of the traditional Fourth Amend-
ment limits, and often without any individualized suspicion at 
all.  
B. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S (NON)EXISTING USE-
RESTRICTION RULES  
The government’s broad collection rules plainly raise their 
own privacy concerns, but even if they did not, postcollection 
use would still pose such threats. Indeed, the government’s 
broad collection power might not be so alarming if there were 
reliable limits on how the government used the information in 
its possession. As this Section will demonstrate, however, the 
conventional wisdom is that once data is in the government’s 
hands, the Constitution has nothing to say at all.118 In the 
 
routine searches of people and their effects at the border are “reasonable simp-
ly by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border”). The advent of digital 
storage devices, such as laptops, cell phones, and thumb drives, has generated 
numerous questions regarding the application of the border search doctrine to 
the contents of these devices. The Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on 
the issue, but courts addressing the question have consistently held that rou-
tine inspection of electronic media—which would include booting up a device, 
reviewing its contents, and using search functions to find and review specific 
files—is permissible, even in the absence of suspicion. See, e.g., United States 
v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 549 (D. Md. 2014); United States v. Ickes, 
393 F.3d 501, 502–03 (4th Cir. 2005). The rule is slightly less permissive when 
it comes to forensic border searches, which generally entail making a mirror of 
the entire contents of the digital device, and then subjecting that copy to scru-
tiny using analytic software to recover hidden, deleted, or encrypted data. See 
Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 547–48. To engage in forensic searches, the gov-
ernment must have individualized suspicion, which is not a particularly high 
bar. Id. at 570 (“This standard is far from onerous.”). 
 117. See Investigations and Police Practices—Warrantless Searches and 
Seizures, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 48 (2015) (listing additional ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement). 
 118. E.g., United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 
1162, 1173 (9th Cir. 2010) (“It goes without saying that lawfully seized evi-
dence may not be suppressed.”); Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 67–68 (1st 
Cir. 2010) (retaining a former offender ’s DNA profile “does not constitute a 
separate search under the Fourth Amendment”); see also Balkin, supra note 
55, at 20 (“[B]ecause the Fourth Amendment focuses on searches and seizures, 
it places few limits on collation and analysis.”); Joh, supra note 11, at 63 (“If 
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words of one respected jurist, “the [F]ourth [A]mendment does 
not control how properly collected information is deployed.”119  
Whatever logic this constitutional vacuum may have had 
in the past, the absence of use restrictions cannot persist in the 
face of the convergence of two factors. First, there remains very 
little information about what we do, where we go, what we pur-
chase, or with whom we communicate that some third party 
does not record and store digitally. This means the government 
will have access to an ever-growing amount of information 
about each individual American. Similarly, we now live in a 
networked world. Many Americans have family, friends, or 
business associates all around the globe. With international 
communications ubiquitous and—so long as you can find a Wi-
Fi connection—free, long distance phone charges are a thing of 
the past. Moreover, much of this international interaction takes 
place through modes of communication—e-mails, instant mes-
sages, video and voice chats, videos, photos, voice-over-IP (such 
as Skype or FaceTime), and other digital tools—that are subject 
to collection under the Section 702 program.120 Accordingly, a 
great deal more of our communications are likely vulnerable to 
collection.  
Second, contemporary technology permits the government 
to collect, store, aggregate, and analyze large volumes of data 
in ways that were either unavailable or cost prohibitive for 
most of America’s history.121 So even as we generate more and 
more digital information about ourselves, the government’s ca-
 
[information] acquisition is permissible, how the police use that information 
thereafter is generally not subject to an additional Fourth Amendment chal-
lenge.”); Kerr, supra note 22, at 6 (“If the government comes across infor-
mation legally, then it is free to use that information however officials would 
like.”); Erin Murphy, Back to the Future: The Curious Case of United States v. 
Jones, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 325, 330–31 (2012) (“Current Fourth Amend-
ment law emphasizes acquisition . . . . It cares little for what happens next—to 
what use that information is put.”); William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill 
Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 
857 (2001) (“Fourth Amendment law regulates the government’s efforts to un-
cover information, but it says nothing about what the government may do with 
the information it uncovers.”). 
 119. Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., 
concurring). 
 120. Greenwald & MacAskill, supra note 74; see also supra notes 70–110 
and accompanying text (describing the Section 702 program). 
 121. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technol-
ogies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 
(2004) (discussing the impact of changing technologies on Fourth Amendment 
doctrine). 
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pacity for exploiting that information grows.122 Thanks to con-
temporary technology, government information collection and 
analysis powers have grown substantially in recent decades. 
And while over time there have been some technology-driven 
changes to constitutional rules regarding government collec-
tion, the rules (or lack of them) when it comes to information 
use have remained stagnant.  
C. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
Two recent Supreme Court cases starkly illustrate the 
pressure that modern technology places on existing Fourth 
Amendment doctrine. In United States v. Jones and Riley v. 
California, the Supreme Court recognized the transformative 
nature of data aggregation and considered whether current 
doctrine needs to be modified in response.123 United States v. 
Jones presented almost exactly the same question that Knotts 
considered nearly three decades earlier—whether tracking a 
vehicle’s location on public thoroughfares over time constitutes 
a search124—a question that Knotts answered in the nega-
tive.125 Jones presented the issue, however, in a more techno-
logically sophisticated context: whether law enforcement had 
engaged in an unlawful search when it placed a GPS device on 
a suspect’s car without a valid warrant and used it to collect a 
detailed account of his movements over the course of several 
weeks.  
 
 122. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 10, at 497 (comparing an 
automobile tracking device to the historic practice of police following a defend-
ant on a highway or street). 
 123. The need for Fourth Amendment doctrine to accommodate technologi-
cal change did not suddenly arise for the first time in the twenty-first century. 
Doctrine began grappling with technology’s effects by at least the 1920s. In 
United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927), for example, the Supreme Court 
held that the Coast Guard did not engage in a search when it used a search-
light to illuminate otherwise hidden cases of alcohol on a boat during the Pro-
hibition Era. See also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding 
that the use of a thermal imaging device to monitor the radiation of heat from 
a home is a search). Throughout American history, as investigative methods 
have evolved, courts have continuously recalibrated the doctrine, sometimes 
announcing new rules, sometimes simply explaining how the old rules applied 
to new contexts. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967); 
see also Kerr, supra note 27, at 531 (explaining how courts adjust Fourth 
Amendment doctrine in response to technology to maintain the balance of 
power between would-be criminals and the government). 
 124. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012). 
 125. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983); see also supra notes 
93–95 and accompanying text. 
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While the Jones majority opinion rested its holding that 
this did constitute a search on the decidedly nontechnological 
fact that government officials “physically occupied private 
property” when they placed the GPS device on Jones’s car,126 
two concurrences (representing five justices) recognized that 
the case implicated larger questions about how the Fourth 
Amendment should approach technological advances. Justice 
Alito argued that long-term GPS surveillance violates a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.127 Justice Sotomayor explained 
how several technological factors have combined to change the 
nature—and hence the intrusiveness—of location information 
since the Court decided Knotts.128 Contemporary monitoring 
tools provide a much more detailed, complete set of data,129 and 
are much more likely to be used because they are cheap and in-
visible.130 Justice Alito made a similar point when observing 
that, “[i]n the precomputer age, the greatest protections of pri-
vacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical. 
Traditional surveillance for any extended period of time was 
difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.”131 Moreo-
ver, Sotomayor pointed out, once collected, the government can 
“store such records and efficiently mine them for information 
years into the future.”132 As a result, Justice Sotomayor con-
cluded, such collection is fundamentally different in kind from 
physical surveillance aided by a beeper like the one in 
 
 126. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404. 
 127. Id. at 430–31 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 128. Id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 129. Id. at 414–16 (noting the extensive personal information that use of 
GPS devices can generate, including “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic sur-
geon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the crimi-
nal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, 
synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on”). 
 130. Id. at 416 (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)) (noting 
the low cost and minimal manpower required for GPS surveillance allow the 
government to evade “the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforce-
ment practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility’”); see also 
Jones, 565 U.S. at 429–30 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that historically the 
most effective privacy protections were practical rather than constitutional or 
statutory and that the monitoring at issue in Jones “would have required a 
large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance,” a use 
of resources that would only have been limited to “investigation[s] of unusual 
importance”); Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the 
Cost of Surveillance: Making Cents out of United States v. Jones, 123 YALE 
L.J. ONLINE 335, 341–50 (2014). 
 131. Jones, 565 U.S. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 132. Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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Knotts.133 Courts must “take these attributes,” she argues, “into 
account when considering the existence of a reasonable societal 
expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s public movements.”134  
To be sure, the government might obtain the exact same 
information through analog surveillance techniques as it could 
via long-term GPS monitoring.135 But this does not mean that 
GPS monitoring poses the same level of intrusion as conven-
tional surveillance. For most of our history, practical impedi-
ments precluded law enforcement from collecting the infor-
mation captured by GPS devices. Law enforcement is unlikely 
to invest the resources required to follow someone like Jones, 
who was suspected of possession with the intent to distribute 
cocaine, twenty-four hours a day for several weeks. Moreover, 
due to these practical constraints, courts never had to face the 
question whether months-long twenty-four-hour surveillance 
constituted a search. Hence Justice Sotomayor’s conclusion 
that the surveillance at issue in Jones presented a novel ques-
tion not controlled by short-term surveillance cases like Knotts. 
In eliminating these practical obstacles to physical surveil-
lance, technological advances do not only permit more collec-
tion. More importantly, the volume of collection amounts to an 
entirely new sort of surveillance: the results of aggregating that 
data, enabling the government to extract knowledge (intimate 
details abut our daily lives, activities, and relationships) in 
which we have always had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Now that technology has eliminated the practical obstacle to 
aggregating large amounts of location information, the courts 
must erect a doctrinal bulwark to protect that expectation of 
privacy. 
In other words, certain technology, when combined with 
storage and analysis capacity, raises the aggregation problem 
in a way that implicates reasonable expectations of privacy. At 
least five members of the Court recognized the distinction be-
tween government access to information revealed piecemeal (an 
individual’s location in public at any given moment in time) 
and access to an extensive dossier assembled by aggregating 
many isolated pieces of information (the compilation of weeks 
of information about Jones’s vehicle’s location).136 The D.C. Cir-
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 416. 
 135. Id. at 415. 
 136. See id. at 413, 418 (Sotomayor, J., concurring and Alito, J., concur-
ring). 
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cuit Court’s Judge Ginsburg perhaps put it best when he ex-
plained in the lower court’s opinion in Jones that,  
It is one thing for a passerby to observe or even to follow someone 
during a single journey as he goes to the market or returns home from 
work. It is another thing entirely for that stranger to pick up the 
scent again the next day and the day after that, week in and week 
out, dogging his prey until he has identified all the places, people, 
amusements, and chores that make up that person’s hitherto private 
routine.137 
So while we may have no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
one piece of information about our location in public, the calcu-
lus regarding long-term GPS surveillance is different, given the 
conclusions one can draw from the aggregation of location in-
formation spanning several weeks. 
In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court also acknowl-
edged the potential intrusiveness facilitated by modern tech-
nology’s ability to aggregate large amounts of information.138 
Riley presented the question whether law enforcement officials 
may, without a warrant, search the digital information con-
tained on a smartphone seized in a search incident to arrest.139 
In searching David Riley upon his arrest for driving on a sus-
pended license, the arresting officer found Riley’s smartphone 
in his pocket and looked through it, discovering evidence that 
Riley had gang connections.140 The Court had to decide whether 
the information gleaned from the cell phone was lawfully col-
lected or whether its collection exceeded the scope of the 
search-incident-to-arrest warrant exception.141 
Again, the Court—this time in an opinion joined by all nine 
justices—took the broader view of the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections, pointing to the ways in which new technology 
changed the analysis on which the search-incident-to-arrest 
doctrine relied. While smartphones like Riley’s were unheard of 
ten years ago, the Court noted, “a significant majority of Amer-
ican adults now own such phones.”142 Moreover, these phones 
 
 137. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 560 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff ’d 
sub nom. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 138. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014). 
 139. Searches incident to arrest, in which an arresting officer may search 
the arrestee’s person and immediate surroundings to ensure the preservation 
of evidence and officer safety, are a recognized exception to the warrant re-
quirement. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (acknowledging the 
permissible scope of such searches has long been a source of debate). 
 140. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 2484. 
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grant access to “vast quantities of personal information.”143 So 
while “a mechanical application” of doctrine “might well sup-
port the warrantless search,” the Court determined that such 
an application was inappropriate when it comes to 
smartphones.144 Permitting such devices to be searched with no 
warrant would pose a significantly greater intrusion into indi-
vidual privacy than a traditional search incident to arrest of 
the nondigital contents of one’s pockets.145 
As with GPS-generated location data, the privacy implica-
tions of smartphone data distinguishes it from familiar pre-
smartphone contexts not only in volume but also in the nature 
of the information.146 A phone with Internet access will have 
search and browsing history, which could reveal an individual’s 
private interests or concerns—“perhaps a search for certain 
symptoms of disease, coupled with frequent visits to 
WebMD.”147 Given the nature of the revelations that searches 
of smartphone contents permit, the Court determined that in-
dividuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those con-
tents, even in the course of a valid search incident to arrest.148 
Less recently, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the 
ability of data aggregation to exacerbate privacy concerns in 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) context.149 United 
States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Free-
dom of the Press considered a request under FOIA for a particu-
lar individual’s criminal record.150 The Court rejected the re-
quest, holding that even though criminal records are publicly 
available, disclosing a complete rap sheet would be an unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy.151 The Court noted that, 
“there is a vast difference between the public records that 
might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, coun-
 
 143. Id. at 2484–85; see also id. at 2488 (equating a search of all data 
stored on a cell phone to a search of an arrestee’s wallet or purse was “like say-
ing a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the 
moon” because both are ways to get “from point A to point B, but little else jus-
tifies lumping them together”). 
 144. Id. at 2484. 
 145. Id. at 2488–89. 
 146. Id. at 2489. 
 147. Id. at 2490. 
 148. Id. at 2493. 
 149. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) 
(as amended). 
 150. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 
U.S. 749 (1989). 
 151. Id. at 763–70. 
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ty archives, and local police stations throughout the country 
and a computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse 
of information.”152 As a result, it reasoned, there is a distinction 
“between scattered disclosure of the bits of information con-
tained in a rap sheet and revelation of the rap sheet as a 
whole.”153  
As these cases show, the Supreme Court has already begun 
to recognize that doctrine must account for the government’s 
technology-enabled ability to glean new kinds of knowledge. 
Both Jones and Riley, as well as commentators’ suggestions for 
reforms,154 however, remain focused on the proper scope of col-
lection, trying to calibrate what should be available to the gov-
ernment in the first place. I suggest below that rather than (or 
in addition to) modifying collection rules, courts should employ 
use restrictions, subjecting some uses of even lawfully collected 
information to independent Fourth Amendment regulation.  
The critical point here is that revelations that the govern-
ment can glean by querying these databases are different in 
kind from revelations gleaned by collection alone. That is to 
say, more data is not necessarily just more data. More data can 
mean different data. The aggregation problem means that the 
right combination of multiple pieces of data can reveal data of 
an entirely novel—and much more sensitive—nature. So while 
basic information routinely revealed to the public at large (like 
momentary location information) may lack constitutional sig-
nificance, five Supreme Court Justices have indicated that the 
government’s ability to build an individual’s profile beyond the 
scope of what law enforcement agencies would acquire in the 
absence of the ability to aggregate presents a distinct ques-
tion.155  
III.  TREATING QUERIES AS SEARCHES   
This Article argues that the best way to address the aggre-
gation problem is to reject the idea that the Constitution should 
remain indifferent to information use. Instead, doctrine should 
acknowledge that some postcollection and aggregation uses of 
information qualify as Fourth Amendment events in their own 
 
 152. Id. at 763–64. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See supra sources cited in note 8. 
 155. Benjamin J. Priester, Five Answers and Three Questions After United 
States v. Jones (2012), the Fourth Amendment “GPS Case,” 65 OKLA. L. REV. 
491, 522 (2013). 
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right. This Part makes the case that some queries of aggregat-
ed databases for information about U.S. persons constitute 
such a use. Section A argues that there some queries violate 
reasonable expectations of privacy just as surely as some physi-
cal searches do, and that those queries should be regulated as 
searches.156 Section B offers a means to implement this sugges-
tion by demonstrating that the FISA Court has provided a 
model for such regulation. Finally, Section C discusses why use 
restrictions must derive from the Constitution, rather than 
from statutory or regulatory sources.  
Before turning to my argument, however, a clarification is 
in order: there is a distinction between analyzing large data 
sets in search of patterns—what is typically referred to as data 
mining—and querying a data set for information about a par-
ticular U.S. person.157 Retrieving information using query-and-
report tools identifies what responsive bits of information a da-
tabase contains about a specific individual, whereas data min-
ing uses automated processes to discover patterns within the 
data. My argument applies only to queries. There may be in-
stances when data mining is sufficiently invasive that it, too, 
should be considered a search; that, however, is a question for 
another paper.158 
A. WHY (AT LEAST SOME) QUERIES ARE SEARCHES 
As noted above, courts determine what qualifies as a 
Fourth Amendment search by employing the inquiry first an-
nounced in Justice Harlan’s seminal concurrence in Katz v. 
United States, which instructs that the Fourth Amendment 
 
 156. I take no position here on how these searches should be regulated—
i.e., whether they should require probable cause and warrants or whether 
some less demanding standard of review, such as reasonable suspicion, would 
be appropriate. 
 157. Data mining is the “process of identifying valid, novel, potentially use-
ful and ultimately understandable patterns in data” or “the application of da-
tabase technology and techniques—such as statistical analysis and modeling—
to uncover hidden patterns . . . .” 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: 
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.7(e) (5th ed. 2012) (citations and 
internal quotations omitted); see also Taipale, supra note 58, at 37–39 (2003) 
(noting the difference between data aggregation analyzed with subject-based 
queries and the use of actual data mining). 
 158. Imagine, for example, that an algorithm identifies the following pat-
tern: individuals who have both attended services at a mosque and traveled to 
South Asia are more likely to access terrorist propaganda online. It is not clear 
whether extracting a list of names of individuals who meet that pattern is any 
less invasive than a query about a specific individual. I hope to explore this 
and related questions about other forms of data use in future work. 
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regulates government activity when it violates an individual’s 
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”159 Like the third-party doc-
trine, the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test is subjected to 
its fair share of criticism, due in large part to its indetermina-
cy—it is often impossible to divine ex ante whether a court will 
find that a given set of facts violates a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.160 Determining which expectations of privacy are 
reasonable is therefore more art than science.161 Yet Katz re-
mains the law of the land.  
In this Section, I argue that, at the very least, a query con-
stitutes a search if it returns information whose exposure clear-
ly would qualify as a search if that exposure was achieved by 
collection rather than query. In other words, when queries re-
sult in revelations that the Supreme Court has held would vio-
late an expectation of privacy if achieved through collection, 
that query is a search. In such cases, the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy is no less violated because it was accomplished 
through a query rather than a more traditional search.  
 
 159. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., con-
curring). 
 160. For a representative catalogue of the scholarly critiques of the reason-
able-expectation-of-privacy test, see William Baude & James Y. Stern, The 
Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1825 
n.7 (2016) (collecting articles critiquing the test as ambiguous, subjective, un-
predictable, conceptually confused, and circular). As the leading treatise on 
searches and seizures puts it, the Supreme Court in Katz rejected the then-
existing, arguably outmoded, Fourth Amendment principles while offering “lit-
tle to fill the void” it had created. LAFAVE, supra note 157 § 2.1(a) (“The Su-
preme Court . . . has never managed to set out a comprehensive definition of 
the word ‘searches’ as it is used in the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Anthony 
G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 
403 (1974) (arguing that the question whether something is a search is “a val-
ue judgment” regarding how much “privacy and freedom” may be diminished 
by government surveillance before the Constitution imposes restraints); Orin 
S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 
504 (2007) (“[N]o one seems to know what makes an expectation of privacy 
constitutionally ‘reasonable.’”). 
 161. Of course the Supreme Court has made clear that some collection ac-
tivities definitively constitute a search. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (finding that the examination of interior of private home 
with thermal imaging sensor was a search). Conversely, others definitively do 
not. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (holding that po-
lice examination of contents of an individual’s trash left at the curb for collec-
tion was not a search); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (holding 
that police surveillance of private property from a plane in navigable airspace 
was not a search). For cases that present novel facts, the Supreme Court’s 
eventual outcome is often unclear. See supra notes 81–92 and accompanying 
text (discussing the third-party doctrine). 
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When queries return information whose collection by other 
means arguably violates a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
but the courts have not yet determined whether those means 
constitute a search, the question becomes more difficult. The 
government’s acquisition of long-term location information 
about an individual provides a good example. Case law does not 
clearly indicate whether this acquisition violates a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and therefore constitutes a search. A 
query that returns long-term location information by aggregat-
ing information from multiple sources—say CSLI, license plate 
reader records, toll records, and facial recognition paired with 
surveillance camera footage—therefore may or may not qualify 
as a search, depending on how the Supreme Court ultimately 
decides the question. When faced with knowledge acquired by 
query whose independent collection does not violate a clearly 
established reasonable expectation of privacy, courts must 
simply engage in the same analysis that they perform when 
faced with a new form of collection. They will have to apply the 
Katz test, and make a judgment regarding whether the expo-
sure of that information should be labeled a search. While this 
leaves uncertainty regarding which queries are permitted, the 
same is true of new collection methods until the courts resolve 
their status. When it comes to CSLI, for example, the govern-
ment has implemented a policy of seeking warrants out of an 
abundance of caution while we await the Supreme Court’s rul-
ing. It could take the same approach to queries whose status is 
uncertain. 
Queries of Section 702–acquired information using U.S. 
person identifiers present a stark example of the first type of 
query.162 Americans unquestionably have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the contents of our electronic communications 
and to collect them directly the government must first obtain ex 
ante judicial approval, based on probable cause, in the form of a 
warrant or a FISC order.163 Queries seeking U.S. person infor-
mation in Section 702–aquired information—which includes a 
“potentially very large” volume of “communications between 
lawful targets and U.S. persons that are not the type of com-
 
 162. For a description of the Section 702 program, see supra notes 70–110 
and accompanying text. 
 163. 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (2012) (discussing foreign intelligence investiga-
tions); 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (discussing criminal investigations). 
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munications Section 702 was not designed to collect”164 that 
may “include family photographs, love letters, personal finan-
cial matters, discussions of physical and mental health, and po-
litical and religious exchanges”165—can yield this normally con-
stitutionally protected data with no individualized suspicion, 
particularity, or ex ante judicial approval.166 The government 
thus may “use queries to digitally compile the entire body of 
communications” associated with an individual, even if that in-
dividual is a U.S. person.167 And in fact, the FBI’s internal reg-
ulations permit exactly that.168 Such queries have actually 
come to be known as the Fourth Amendment’s backdoor loop-
hole, because they arguably serve as an end-run around the 
Fourth Amendment itself.169 While information about the ex-
tent to which the government takes advantage of this “loop-
hole” is imperfect,170 a FISC judge discouraged Congress from 
 
 164. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 11, [Redacted] (FISA Ct., Oct. 16, 2015); see 
also Transcript of Proceedings Held Before the Honorable Thomas F. Hogan at 
5–6, In re [Redacted] (FISA Ct., Oct. 20, 2015) (arguing that the FBI’s rules 
regarding Section 702 queries “do not provide sufficient safeguards of the U.S. 
Person information that” Section 702 collects). 
 165. Hearing on Oversight and Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments 
Act: The Balance Between National Security, Privacy and Civil Liberties Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 7 (2016) (statement of David Me-
dine, Chairman, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board). 
 166. Professor Laura Donohue has argued that, when used to search for 
violations of the criminal law, queries of Section 702–acquired material should 
be considered searches requiring a warrant. Donohue, supra note 72, at 262–
63. 
 167. PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT, supra note 71, at 131; see also id. at 127 
(noting that the privacy implications of Section 702 are not limited to collec-
tion, “but must also consider how information about U.S. persons is treated 
after collection”). 
 168. Memorandum Opinion & Order at 44, [Redacted] (FISA Ct., Nov. 6, 
2015). 
 169. See, e.g., Elizabeth Goitein, The FBI’s Warrantless Surveillance Back 
Door Just Opened a Little Wider, JUSTSECURITY (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www 
.justsecurity.org/30699/fbis-warrantless-surveillance-door-opened-wider. A re-
cent FISC opinion reached the opposite conclusion, determining that queries 
using U.S. person identifiers did not render the Section 702 program unrea-
sonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. Memorandum Opinion & Order at 
77, [Redacted] (FISA Ct., Nov. 6, 2015). 
 170. PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT, supra note 71, at 130–31 (noting that 
the FBI “does not separately designate [queries] that employ U.S. person iden-
tifiers, and so the number of [such] queries performed by the FBI is not 
known” making “the manner in which the FBI is employing U.S. person que-
ries . . . difficult to evaluate”). 
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requiring ex ante authorization for such queries because they 
are so common that the requests would swamp the court.171 
It is less certain whether the type of query at issue in the 
Section 215 telephony metadata program or the GPS tracking 
in Jones violates a reasonable expectation of privacy. These 
types of cases of course present difficult line-drawing challeng-
es.172 In the Section 215 program, the government (1) collected 
the metadata of all Americans’ phone calls (metadata not sub-
ject to Fourth Amendment protections because the government 
secured it from a third party); (2) combined that metadata into 
a single database; and (3) then queried that database in search 
of as-yet-unknown terrorist operatives in the United States.173 
Without the capacity to aggregate these records, the govern-
ment could acquire Individual X’s phone records and learn all 
of the phone numbers with which Individual X communi-
cates.174 If the government wanted to know more about the 
communications of people who use the numbers with which In-
dividual X is in contact, however, it would have to request indi-
vidually the records associated with each of the numbers Indi-
vidual X called or from whom Individual X received a call. And 
if it wanted more information about the numbers with which 
those numbers were in contact, it would have to do the same 
thing again. A conservative estimate says that two such “hops” 
would require the government to seek and review records asso-
ciated with at least 10,000 phone numbers.175 And if the gov-
ernment expanded the inquiry to three hops, the applicable 
rule for most of the Section 215 program’s history, that number 
would rise to around 2.5 million.176 Just as law enforcement is 
unlikely to follow Mr. Jones’s car twenty-four hours a day for 
several weeks running, intelligence officials are unlikely to un-
 
 171. Letter from Hon. John D. Bates, Dir., Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, to 
Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Chair, U.S. Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, at 2 
(Jan. 13, 2014). 
 172. See Simmons, supra note 22, at 7–8. 
 173. PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 62, at 21–31 (explaining ac-
cess procedures for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investiga-
tions subject to Section 215). 
 174. Id. Section 215 requires only that the information sought be relevant 
to an ongoing investigation.  
 175. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 31 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and 
remanded, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (containing the estimate cited by the 
court).  
 176. Noa Yachot, Writers, Lawmakers, and the NRA Support ACLU Chal-
lenge to NSA Spying, ACLU (Sept. 4, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national 
-security/writers-lawmakers-and-nra-support-aclu-challenge-nsa-spying. 
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dertake this chore on the off chance that they will spot a con-
nection to a known terrorist.  
Given a database that includes everyone’s phone records, 
however, one query using Individual X’s phone number would 
return all numbers within the specified number of hops.177 In 
one mouse click, the government can discover not only the list 
of individuals and institutions who were recipients or origina-
tors of Individual X’s phone calls, but also generate a map of 
their entire communications network and the networks of eve-
ryone with whom they is in contact.178 Thus, even if we volun-
tarily relinquish our phone records to our communications pro-
vider, as the third-party doctrine assumes, the ability to map 
our entire social and professional network and what the gov-
ernment may learn from it is far more intrusive than simply 
gathering a list of numbers with which one person was in con-
tact. Just as five justices believed that using a GPS tracking 
device to combine data available to the government in unaggre-
gated form violated a reasonable expectation of privacy,179 so 
too might this creation of an electronic rolodex violate an indi-
vidual’s expectations of privacy, even if the collection of each 
individual set of phone records does not.180 In cases like this, it 
will not always be clear ex ante when a query will be consid-
ered a search. But the same is true of any application of the 
Katz test to novel circumstances.181  
 
 177. In part for this reason, when Congress renewed Section 215 in the 
USA FREEDOM ACT of 2015, it barred the government from amassing data-
bases through the bulk collection of records. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. 
L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861). 
 178. See supra note 161 (referring to a graphics interchange format (GIF) 
with map showing hops). 
 179. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text. 
 180. One district court implicitly accepted this premise when arguing that 
the bulk metadata program did not present the same Fourth Amendment 
question as that of third-party-records cases like Smith v. Maryland and 
should not qualify for the third-party-records Fourth Amendment exemption. 
Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 31. 
 181. See Kerr, supra note 160, at 503 (describing the difficulty in anticipat-
ing what constitutes a search under Katz as having “disappointed scholars and 
frustrated students for four decades”). Indeed, judges have reached con-
trasting conclusions on the question whether the collection aspect of Section 
215 constituted a search. Compare Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 31 (holding 
that bulk telephony metadata should not qualify for the third-party exemp-
tion), with In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of 
Tangible Things from [Redacted] (FISA Ct., Aug. 25, 2013) (holding that the 
third-party doctrine applies to bulk telephony metadata). 
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The issue of aggregating location data provides another ex-
ample. In Jones, several of the justices believed the surveil-
lance violated a reasonable expectation of privacy, and yet the 
Court did not settle the question whether extended GPS sur-
veillance constitutes a search in the absence of a physical tres-
pass.182 The Fourth Amendment status of the collection of CSLI 
remains similarly unsettled.183 Or imagine a database of all the 
information gathered by a citywide network of license plate 
readers. The government could query that database for all cars 
that ran the red light at the intersection of Main and Broad-
way. Such a query seems to fall under the Knotts rule because 
it is isolated information about a vehicle’s location in a public 
place.184 But the government also could query that database for 
all instances in which it captured the license plate of Jane’s ve-
hicle. Like the GPS device in Jones, that query could reveal 
many of the private details of Jane’s everyday life by identify-
ing the places that Jane frequents. Just as the Jones surveil-
lance arguably violates a reasonable expectation of privacy, so 
too might the query of the license-plate-reader data. Such que-
ries do not clearly fall on one side of the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy line or the other. Eventually, however, 
appeals courts will reach a consensus on these specific issues, 
or the Supreme Court will announce a rule. There is no reason 
this form of rulemaking, so central to our common law system, 
cannot be applied to database queries in the same way it is ap-
plied to novel questions about information collection. 
Another potential objection to this approach is, how will an 
analyst know, prior to running a query, what information it 
will return? Since the Fourth Amendment status rests on the 
nature of the information that the query reveals, rather than 
the nature of the query itself, it might seem to demand that 
analysts have a crystal ball enabling them to anticipate wheth-
er any particular query will qualify as a search. While this is 
not an insignificant concern, it can be addressed in a couple of 
ways. First, there will be times when an analyst running a que-
ry will know for sure that the query should be treated as a 
search. Any query of a database that includes Americans’ com-
munications content will, necessarily, implicate a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Second, there will be times when an an-
 
 182. See supra notes 124–37 and accompanying text (discussing the Jones 
majority and concurrences). 
 183. See supra note 40 (defining CSLI and citing cases). 
 184. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text (discussing Knotts). 
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alyst will not know for certain that her query will return 
Fourth Amendment protected knowledge, but will have a 
sense—based on the nature of the data being queried as well as 
the reason for running the query—whether the resulting 
knowledge will categorize the query as a search. A query of a 
database with comprehensive historical location data, for ex-
ample, can be expected to reveal intimate details of the query 
subject’s life akin to those revealed by GPS surveillance in 
Jones.185 Over time, as the nature of information that certain 
sets of databases return, it might become much clearer ex ante 
when a reasonable expectation of privacy is at stake. Finally, it 
may be that this uncertainty can be captured in the substantive 
rules that apply to queries that qualify as searches. For exam-
ple, perhaps such queries qualify as an exception to the war-
rant requirement, and so the analyst’s decision to query must 
simply be reasonable.186 Under such a regime, any query that 
unexpectedly returns information protected by a reasonable 
expectation of privacy might be considered reasonable nonethe-
less. Just as the existing application of the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test presents difficult and often hard-to-
predict line-drawing exercises on the part of law enforcement 
and the courts, so too will determining when queries must be 
treated as searches (and what limits should be placed on such 
searches). But just as this has not prevented Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine regarding collection to develop, the same could 
prove true in the context of information use, such as queries. 
To be sure, this rule represents a significant change in con-
ceptualizing the protective scope of the Fourth Amendment. 
And yet it is no more significant a change than Katz itself rep-
resented. Prior to Katz, Olmstead v. United States governed 
what qualified as a search.187 Under the Olmstead regime, the 
government did not engage in a search unless it physically in-
truded into a “constitutionally protected area.”188 Thus in 
Olmstead, installing a tap on telephone wires “did not amount 
to a search . . . within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,” 
because the wires themselves were not located in a constitu-
 
 185. See generally supra note 98 (discussing the results of the GPS surveil-
lance in Jones). 
 186. See supra note 98 (defining reasonableness as an exception to the war-
rant requirement). 
 187. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 188. E.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 (1967). 
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tionally protected area, like Olmstead’s home or office.189 Over 
time, however, the Court “departed from the narrow view on 
which [Olmstead] rested,” and, finally, in Katz explicitly reject-
ed the “constitutionally protected area” formulation in favor of 
inquiring into “what [an individual] seeks to preserve as pri-
vate, even in an area accessible to the public.”190 And so was 
born the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test.191  
In rejecting the Olmstead approach, the Katz majority not-
ed that, “[t]o read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore 
the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in pri-
vate communication.”192 Similarly, to refuse to acknowledge the 
expectation of privacy Americans have in the results of some 
queries is to ignore the technological changes in how infor-
mation is stored, transferred, collected, and analyzed. If, as 
Katz declared, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places,”193 it should protect them against violations of their 
reasonable expectations of privacy regardless of the means by 
which that violation is accomplished. Justice Harlan declared 
in his Katz concurrence that “reasonable expectations of priva-
cy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical inva-
sion.”194 If a wiretap that reveals “what [an individual] seeks to 
preserve as private” is a search, then a query that exposes that 
same information represents just as significant an intrusion.195 
Regulating queries as searches also makes more sense 
than trying to address this issue by reforming collection rules. 
To be sure, one can argue that Fourth Amendment harm occurs 
the moment the government collects information about an indi-
vidual. When it comes to the type of collection at issue here, we 
tend to retain our anonymity at the point of collection. Infor-
mation about our spending or travel habits, or even the content 
of our Google chats, may be sitting on the government’s servers, 
but nobody is looking at them. To the extent the goal is barring 
arbitrary government action to protect each individual from 
unreasonable intrusion into his or her zone of privacy, the mo-
ment government action becomes problematic is when it singles 
 
 189. 277 U.S. at 466. 
 190. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 352. 
 193. Id. at 351. 
 194. Id. at 362 (Harlan, J. concurring). 
 195. Id. 
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out an individual for scrutiny.196 Once the government has a 
particular individual in its sights, it can extract details from 
the vast ocean of data about that person. And it is at that mo-
ment—when the government generates a detailed profile about 
you from a sea of aggregated data—that Fourth Amendment 
rules barring arbitrary intrusive action should apply. If we 
worry about the government extracting information about spe-
cific individuals, then the concern manifests itself at the mo-
ment of extraction. Addressing the concern at its source also al-
lows us to protect individual rights while continuing valuable 
collection programs.  
There are also technological barriers to relying on collec-
tion rules to do all the work. As the President’s Council of Advi-
sors on Science and Technology pointed out, data sometimes 
contains “latent information about individuals,” which is re-
vealed only if exposed to certain forms of analysis.197 One can-
not regulate the collection of data one cannot see. Moreover, the 
aggregation of multiple data points from one form of collection 
(such as location data) can itself pose problems. Only limiting 
or eliminating government collection of all location information 
would address this issue through collection regulation. Finally, 
it is often impossible to know whether any given data point will 
reveal intimate knowledge when combined with other data ei-
ther already in the government’s possession or collected subse-
quently.198  
A final objection might be that queries hold too much value 
as an investigative tool to subject to Fourth Amendment limits. 
Just because some queries constitute searches, however, does 
not mean government investigators cannot perform them. As 
the courts often remind us, “the ‘touchstone’ of the Fourth 
 
 196. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 10, at 489–90 (recognizing 
that harms from information use are distinct from those caused by collection). 
Not only is the collection of large datasets less troubling from an individual 
rights perspective, it can also be quite valuable. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE, DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES 
2–3 (2004) (finding that the government uses data mining to improve service 
or performance, detect fraud, waste, and abuse; analyze scientific and research 
information; detect criminal activity, analyze intelligence and detect terrorist 
activities). 
 197. PCAST, supra note 54, at 39; see also id. at x–xi (“[A] policy focus on 
limiting data collection will not be a broadly applicable or scalable strategy—
nor one likely to achieve the right balance between beneficial results and un-
intended negative consequences (such as inhibiting economic growth).”). 
 198. See id. at 47–48.  
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Amendment is reasonableness.”199 Just because a query quali-
fies as a search does not mean the government must secure a 
warrant based on probable cause. Perhaps it makes sense to in-
clude queries in the list of warrant requirement exceptions, 
such that an analyst running a query must have probable cause 
to do so but need not secure ex ante judicial sign-off. Or per-
haps the courts will consider queries to be more like Terry 
stops,200 requiring only reasonable suspicion. Courts in this 
context must be asked to balance the government’s interest in 
law enforcement against society’s interests in individual rights, 
just as they do in so many other places.  
B. OPERATIONALIZING QUERY-SEARCHES 
Having determined that some database queries are search-
es—referred to hereafter as query-searches201—how can we en-
sure that the government carries them out in a manner con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment? To answer this question, 
this Section first demonstrates that expanding Fourth Amend-
ment protections to some information use is not as radical a 
departure from existing doctrine as it first might appear. It 
then details how the FISC has already provided a roadmap for 
how Fourth Amendment limitations can be imposed on data-
base query-searches.  
1. The Foundation for Constitutionally Based Use Restrictions 
While the Constitution is silent on the government’s use of 
information in the lion’s share of circumstances,202 the Fourth 
Amendment does, in fact, require more than the traditional 
constitutional protections governing searches and seizures in a 
handful of situations. Both Congress and the courts consider 
some information collection methods so intrusive that postcol-
lection constraints on information use are necessary.203 So, in 
some ways recognizing queries as potential searches merely 
expands existing doctrine rather than contradicting it.  
 
 199. E.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). 
 200. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1968)). 
 201. To make plain, when I am referring to queries that should be consid-
ered Fourth Amendment searches, I refer to them as query-searches. 
 202. See supra Part II.B. 
 203. See generally S. REP. NO. 95-701 (1978) (discussing the constraints on 
information use for collection methods); see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 
41 (1967) (stating that wiretapping must have limitations in order to adhere to 
the Fourth Amendment). 
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Nearly fifty years ago, concerns regarding the intrusive na-
ture of wiretapping prompted the Supreme Court to augment 
the Fourth Amendment’s typical warrant requirements (proba-
ble cause, particularity, and review by a neutral magistrate) 
with procedural rules about how the government handled the 
information it collected using that tool.204 The Supreme Court’s 
ruling made it plain to Congress that, to satisfy constitutional 
demands, any use of wiretapping must include information 
handling limits.205 Thus when enacting legislative authoriza-
tion for wiretapping, Congress included such limits, known col-
lectively as minimization procedures.206 Minimization proce-
dures regulate the government’s handling of information so as 
to mitigate the risks that electronic surveillance poses for 
Americans’ individual privacy rights.207 The statutes authoriz-
ing wiretapping for both domestic law enforcement and foreign 
intelligence purposes require minimization.208 While criminal 
investigations implement minimization requirements at the 
moment of collection,209 FISA requires minimization in the re-
tention and dissemination of information as well in order to en-
sure “information concerning American citizens and lawful res-
ident aliens be handled in such a way as to assure that it is 
used only for the purposes specified.”210 The constitutional need 
to minimize information has, over time, expanded beyond the 
wiretapping context and currently applies to collection of tan-
 
 204. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 205. Id. 
 206. See, e.g., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 73 (2d Cir. 1984) (cit-
ing S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 13 (1978)) (“FISA reflects both Congress’s ‘legisla-
tive judgment’ that the court orders and other procedural safeguards laid out 
in [FISA] ‘are necessary to insure that electronic surveillance . . . conforms to 
the fundamental principles of the fourth amendment [sic].’”); Berman, supra 
note 33, at 791–817 (discussing constitutional origins of minimization proce-
dures); Donohue, supra note 72, at 220 (“FISA was Congress’s express decision 
to curb executive power as a constitutional matter.”).  
 207. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2012) (defining minimization procedures); 
PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT, supra note 71, at 50 (asserting that minimiza-
tion procedures impose a “set of controls on data” to “balance privacy and na-
tional security interests”). 
 208. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (every wiretap order “shall contain a provision 
that the authorization to intercept shall be . . . conducted in such a way as to 
minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to inter-
ception”); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804, 1805 (requiring government surveillance applica-
tions and FISC authorization orders to include minimization procedures). 
 209. S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 41 (1978) (stating that criminal procedures are 
an exception to the minimization rule). 
 210. S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 38 (1977). 
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gible things, physical searches, and collection of communica-
tions metadata.211  
The requirement to minimize is imposed statutorily; the 
task of determining exactly what minimization should look like 
in any particular circumstance, however, is left to the courts.212 
Minimization procedures thus represent a mandate to courts to 
include limits on what the government may do with infor-
mation gleaned from at least some forms of collection.  
At times, courts have also imposed limits on the govern-
ment’s use of lawfully collected information even in the absence 
of a legislative requirement.213 Recently, for example, the FISC 
considered whether the FBI’s queries using U.S.-person selec-
tors should be treated as searches subject to Fourth Amend-
ment regulation.214 While the court ultimately rejected the idea 
that such queries were themselves searches, it did not find 
them irrelevant to the constitutional analysis.215 Instead, the 
use to which the government plans to put information collected 
under Section 702, the FISC concluded, should form part of the 
assessment of the reasonableness of the Section 702 program as 
a whole.216 So while the FISC did not impose Fourth Amend-
ment constraints directly on queries as such, it recognized the 
constitutional concerns that can arise out of some uses of in-
formation.217  
Postcollection use has also become an issue for computer 
searches. Because it is often not feasible to identify and isolate 
computer files responsive to a warrant at the time of seizure, it 
is common practice to make identical copies (or mirrors) of 
 
 211. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(D) (collection of tangible things); Id. 
§ 1881(a) (collection of electronic communications by targeting non-U.S. per-
sons overseas); Id. § 1823(a) (physical searches for foreign intelligence purpos-
es). Collection using a pen register or trap-and-trace device, which provides 
information about incoming or outgoing communications, now must employ 
“privacy procedures,” which are simply minimization procedures by another 
name. Id. § 1842(h). See Berman, supra note 33, at 790–817. (providing a his-
tory of the evolution and development of minimization procedures). 
 212. Surveillance laws have consistently assigned the job of determining 
what minimization procedures are appropriate to the courts. 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1805(a)(3), 1861a(1). 
 213. [Redacted] Memorandum and Opinion & Order at 41 (FISA Ct., Nov. 
6, 2015); id. at 40 (rejecting the argument that “each query of Section 702–
acquired information [using U.S.-person identifiers] is a ‘separate action sub-
ject to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test’”). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 42. 
 216. Id. at 40–41. 
 217. Id. at 41–45. 
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computer hard drives to review their contents off-site.218 In so 
doing, however, the government necessarily seizes a great deal 
of nonresponsive material—everything on the computer drive 
unrelated to criminal activity, such as family photos, contact 
lists, emails, and the like. Courts have recently grappled with 
how to limit the government’s access to or use of that nonre-
sponsive information. In United States v. Ganias, for example, 
the court considered whether investigators can obtain a war-
rant to search a set of files the government happens to have in 
its possession because they were seized pursuant to a previous 
warrant, to which those files were not responsive.219 A three-
judge panel of the Second Circuit held that despite the valid in-
itial collection of the information, the government violated the 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by retaining the nonre-
sponsive information in the absence of “some independent ba-
sis” for doing so.220 Permitting the government to “retain all the 
data on [an individual’s] computers on the off chance the in-
formation would become relevant to a subsequent criminal in-
vestigation,” the court said, would “be the equivalent of a gen-
eral warrant.”221 And in his concurring opinion in In re 
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Judge Alex Kozinski articulated 
a list of suggested guidelines for investigators to follow when 
executing searches that are likely to expose investigators to 
nonresponsive information.222 
 
 218. This two-step process of first seizing or copying digital storage devices 
and then searching its contents later is routine. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(B). 
 219. 755 F.3d 125, 138 (2d Cir. 2014), vacated on other grounds, 824 F.3d 
199 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 220. 755 F.3d at 138. The Second Circuit subsequently agreed to hear the 
case en banc, vacated the panel decision, and resolved the case on other 
grounds, declining to rule on the validity of the data retention or the second 
warrant. The en banc court did recognize, however, the highly intrusive na-
ture of the government’s actions, observing that “the seizure of a computer 
hard drive, and its subsequent retention by the government, can give the gov-
ernment possession of a vast trove of personal information about the person to 
whom the drive belongs, much of which may be entirely irrelevant to the crim-
inal investigation that led to the seizure.” Id. 
 221. Id. at 137; accord United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 
2007) (recognizing that “there may be a persuasive argument . . . that an indi-
vidual retains an expectation of privacy in the future uses of her DNA pro-
file”).  
 222. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621. F.3d 1162, 
1178–80 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring). Some magistrate 
judges have also begun imposing limits on how the government executes 
searches of digital storage devices. See Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of 
Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA. L. REV. 1241, 1246 (2010) (noting this 
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These isolated instances, while representing a tentative ex-
tension of Fourth Amendment rules into the use space in cer-
tain contexts, do not go far enough. Each of these examples 
represents what I call a collection-plus regime. Either Congress 
or the courts determine that collection rules alone are insuffi-
cient, so they augment those rules with use restrictions. Nu-
merous commentators have also advocated some form of collec-
tion-plus regime, where postcollection use of information is 
considered relevant to the constitutionality of the original 
search or seizure.223 A collection-plus regime does not inde-
pendently require use constraints, but instead applies them 
cumulatively, adding their procedural protections to those of 
the collection rules. The question is thus whether the whole of 
the government’s action, from collection to use, complies with 
Fourth Amendment demands.  
These collection-plus approaches take a step in the right 
direction by recognizing that the government’s postcollection 
use, at least in certain circumstances, is constitutionally rele-
vant. I contend, however, that collection-plus regimes do not go 
far enough. The most critical shortcoming of collection-plus is 
 
practice and arguing that it is both unwise and beyond the scope of the magis-
trates’ power).  
 223. See, e.g., Deven R. Desai, Constitutional Limits on Surveillance: Asso-
ciational Freedom in the Age of Data Hoarding, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 
625 (2014) (arguing for time limits on the use of data); Stephen E. Henderson, 
Our Records Panopticon and the American Bar Association Standards for 
Criminal Justice, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 699, 720 (2014) (advocating further devel-
opment of use restrictions); Orin S. Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evi-
dence: The Case for Use Restrictions on Nonresponsive Data, 48 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 1, 25 (2015) (“Although the seizure of nonresponsive files is reasonable 
when needed to effectuate the search for responsive files, subsequent use of 
the seized nonresponsive files transforms the nature of the seizure and ren-
ders it constitutionally unreasonable.”); Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data 
Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 51 
(1995) (arguing that “the reasonableness of a seizure extends to the uses that 
law enforcement authorities make of property and information”); Robert S. 
Litt, The Fourth Amendment in the Information Age, 126 YALE L.J.F. 8, 15–16 
(2016) (arguing that courts assessing the constitutionality of government ac-
tion should take into account “not only the nature of the data the government 
is collecting, but the use the government is going to make of that data”); Peter 
Swire, A Reasonableness Approach to Searches After the Jones GPS Tracking 
Case, STAN L. REV. ONLINE, Feb. 2012, https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/ 
online/privacy-paradox-a-reasonableness-approach-to-searches-after-the-jones 
-gps-tracking-case (arguing that factors such as the length and intrusiveness 
of surveillance as well as the use of minimization procedures, if any, should 
factor into the question whether the government search was reasonable); cf. 
Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 388 (2015) 
(noting that acquisition and use restrictions “must go hand-in-hand”). 
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that when it comes to Fourth Amendment–exempt infor-
mation—such as third-party records—there is no constitutional 
analysis into which one could incorporate limits on the gov-
ernment’s postcollection use.224 For all the vast spectrum of in-
formation, ranging from the innocuous to the intensely private, 
that is exempt from Fourth Amendment coverage, courts have 
no opportunity to consider whether the use of that information 
renders its collection unreasonable, because the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement does not apply in 
the first place.225 Moreover, it is not clear at the time of collec-
tion whether or when the aggregation problem will arise with 
respect to particular data. The insight that aggregation permits 
may result only from the combination of data sets that are 
fused after—perhaps years after—the collection has taken 
place.226 The idea of assessing the government’s action as a 
whole in those circumstances is unwieldy at best. If you accept 
the argument that queries of aggregated information reveal 
more than the individual bits of information the government 
collects, we must recognize those uses themselves as searches 
entitled to their own independent Fourth Amendment analysis, 
regardless of how the underlying information was collected.  
2. Implementing Query-Search Limits  
If one accepts the argument that courts should assess que-
ry-searches independently of the means by which the infor-
mation was collected, the question becomes how they might do 
so. Here, I argue that the FISC has already shown us what 
such an analysis might look like. Indeed, the minimization pro-
cedures that FISC judges demanded in their orders approving 
 
 224. Donohue, supra note 72, at 243 (describing Professor Kerr ’s argument 
that “because third-party record collection constitutes neither a search nor a 
seizure, the doctrine would have to be radically overhauled to make all collec-
tion of data a seizure to then trigger a reasonableness analysis”). 
 225. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding that it is neither 
a search nor a seizure to monitor the location of a beeper placed in chemicals 
being transported to owner ’s cabin); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) 
(holding that a telephone company’s use of a pen register is not a search); Hof-
fa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (holding that testimony from conver-
sations between government informant and defendant did not violate the 
search and seizure limits of the Fourth Amendment). But see United States v. 
Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (holding it is a search to monitor a beeper that is 
inside a house and therefore withdrawn from public view). 
 226. See PCAST, supra note 54 at ix; id. at xii (noting that collection rules 
cannot guard against future, unknown privacy threats, so use is “the techni-
cally most feasible place to protect privacy”). 
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the Section 215 bulk metadata collection program look more 
like the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement procedures 
than anything else.227 The Section 215 program itself was not 
subject to Fourth Amendment limits because the government 
argued, and the FISC agreed, that the metadata collection fell 
within the scope of the third-party doctrine.228 The statutes re-
quired minimization procedures, but given the absence of 
Fourth Amendment demands, such procedures could have been 
nominal. As I have argued elsewhere, in imposing robust limits 
on query-searches of the Section 215 database nonetheless, the 
FISC signaled recognition of those query-searches’ Fourth 
Amendment–based implications and demonstrated how other, 
similarly intrusive query-searches might be subject to Fourth 
Amendment oversight.229  
Before demonstrating this point, a quick primer on the 
purposes of each of the warrant requirement’s three elements is 
in order. First, there is ex ante review by a neutral magistrate, 
based on the idea that officials with “investigative and prosecu-
torial duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize con-
stitutionally sensitive means . . . . The historical judgment, 
which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed ex-
ecutive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain” 
information and “overlook potential invasions of privacy and 
protected speech.”230 Second, the cause requirement limits arbi-
trary government action.231 In forcing the government to 
demonstrate that there is an answer to the question why are 
you searching this person or seizing this information?, cause 
requirements guarantee that the search or seizure will be 
based on objective evidence, rather than the exercise of unfet-
 
 227. See infra notes 234–39 and accompanying text. For a detailed discus-
sion of the Section 215 use regime and its constitutional shadings, see Ber-
man, supra note 33, at 806–17. 
 228. See In re [REDACTED], No. PT/TT [REDACTED] (FISA Ct., July 14, 
2004). The limits on the collection of that data were statutory: the information 
had to be both “relevant” to an authorized terrorism or intelligence investiga-
tion and subject to minimization procedures. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b) (2015). 
 229. See Berman, supra note 33, at 817–24. 
 230. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972). 
 231. See Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What’s “Rea-
sonable”: The Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 317 (2016) 
(“[T]he sine qua non of official arbitrariness is allowing officers unfettered ‘dis-
cretion’ to search whenever the whim strikes.”). Individualized suspicion re-
quirements reduce the likelihood of government intrusion on the basis of (im-
plicit or explicit) bias, individual animus, or other improper motives. Id. at 
317–20. 
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tered executive discretion.232 Third, the particularity require-
ment prevents the government from “rummag[ing] through 
homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activi-
ty.”233 So just as the government must explain why it has sin-
gled out a particular individual, it must also explain exactly 
what it expects the search to yield. Together, these require-
ments ensure that a government determination to intrude into 
an individual’s private realm is both objectively justified and 
limited in scope.  
The FISC imposed approximations for each of these ele-
ments in its oversight of the Section 215 program. First, it re-
quired all queries to be approved through ex ante review by a 
high-ranking government official. If the query-search involved 
“seed accounts . . . used by U.S. persons,” approval had to come 
from the NSA’s Office of General Counsel (NSA OGC).234 So 
while individual determinations regarding whose metadata 
would be accessed did not require judicial preapproval, the 
NSA OGC’s approval did serve to diminish discretion by ensur-
ing that officers with “investigative and prosecutorial duty” 
were not “the sole judges” of when to execute queries about U.S. 
persons.235 While someone in the NSA’s OGC is not an inde-
pendent magistrate, she is more able to make an impartial as-
sessment than an agent or official actually involved in an in-
vestigation.  
Second, the FISC imposed a cause standard on Section 215 
query-searches, in the form of the “reasonable articulable sus-
 
 232. When the courts have not insisted on individualized suspicion, they 
have usually insisted on some other means of limiting the discretion of the of-
ficers in the field. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654–55 (1979) (hold-
ing that when the circumstances preclude “insistence upon ‘some quantum of 
individualized suspicion,’ other safeguards are generally relied upon to assure 
that the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not ‘subject to the 
discretion of the official in the field’” (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 
523, 532 (1967))); Friedman & Stein, supra note 231, at 310 (quoting Brown v. 
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52–53 (1979)). But see Eve Brensike Primus, Disentan-
gling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 278–79 (2011) (argu-
ing that the special needs doctrine permits suspicionless searches with no lim-
its on discretion). 
 233. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (citations omitted) 
(pointing out that “the Fourth Amendment was the founding generation’s re-
sponse to the reviled ‘general warrants’ . . . of the colonial era,” which permit-
ted indiscriminate searches). 
 234. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tan-
gible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 06-08, 6 (FISA Ct., Aug. 18, 2006). 
 235. Id. 
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picion” requirement.236 This standard required a determination 
that, “based on the factual and practical considerations of eve-
ryday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there 
are facts giving rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion (RAS) 
that [the particular seed] to be queried is associated with [RE-
DACTED—probably ‘an international terrorist organization’ or 
‘Al Qaeda’].”237 The FISC actually saw the reasonable articula-
ble suspicion standard as analogous to a cause requirement, 
asserting that imposing this limit on query-searches would en-
sure “that ‘[t]he information actually viewed by any human be-
ing . . . will be just as limited—and will be based on the same 
targeted, individual standards’” as searches governed by the 
Fourth Amendment.238  
Finally, the reasonable articulable suspicion standard 
steps in for the particularity requirement as well. That collec-
tion of everyone’s telephone metadata will net a huge amount 
of irrelevant information is a certainty.239 Because query-
searches could be directed only at those seed identifiers for 
which the government had reasonable articulable suspicion of 
connection to a terrorist organization, however, the government 
is limited to inquiries that will yield information related to the 
communications of suspected terrorists and their associates. 
Government officials could not query the database in search of 
nonterrorism-related crimes or threats.  
These minimization requirements are not identical to the 
ones that would apply to the collection of information whose 
seizure required a warrant. But they do create proxies for each 
of those traditional protections. The FISC thus employed min-
imization rules to impose limitations that clearly took Fourth 
Amendment concerns into account.  
3. Implications for Surveillance Programs and Beyond  
Query-searches could be subjected to a regime similar to 
the one the FISC imposed on the Section 215 program.240 This 
 
 236. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tan-
gible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-80, 3 (FISA Ct., Apr. 25, 2013). 
 237. Id. No U.S.-person seed could meet the RAS standard solely on the 
basis of activities protected by the First Amendment. Id. 
 238. In re [REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED], 58 n.41 (FISA Ct., July 
14, 2004) (internal quotations and emphasis omitted). 
 239. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tan-
gible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-109, 18 (FISA Ct., Aug. 29, 2013). 
 240. This Article does not advocate interpreting the Fourth Amendment to 
require for all query-searches the exact same rules that the FISC imposed in 
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is perhaps most compelling in the context of querying Ameri-
cans’ Section 702–acquired communications, which includes the 
contents of U.S. persons’ communications with overseas tar-
gets. The government takes advantage of the absence of consti-
tutional limits to query-search Section 702–acquired infor-
mation using selectors associated with U.S. persons, thereby 
gaining access to the contents of Americans’ communications 
with no individualized suspicion, no particularity requirement, 
and no ex ante review. Hence the “backdoor loophole” moniker 
by which such query-searches are known. 
Unfortunately, the FISC rejected the argument that these 
queries should be treated as searches, instead holding that they 
should be subject to a collection-plus regime.241 According to 
the FISC opinion, the queries are not themselves searches, but 
their use must be factored in to the constitutionality of the Sec-
tion 702 program as a whole.242 But the constitutionality of the 
government’s access to U.S. persons’ communications content 
should not be dependent on how other aspects of the Section 
702 program operate. Access to Americans’ communications 
content is at the heart of traditional Fourth Amendment pro-
tection. The same rules should apply whether the government 
accesses that information from a database sitting on its own 
servers, secures a warrant to acquire that information from a 
communications provider’s server, or executes a warrant to 
seize an individual’s personal computer. Section 702 query-
searches should be considered reasonable only when the gov-
ernment can demonstrate to an executive branch official, or 
(even better) to the FISC itself, individualized suspicion about 
the target of the query-search.243 Moreover, a particularity re-
quirement should limit the government to query-searches that 
are designed to return information relevant to the purpose of 
the program—foreign intelligence information. This would al-
low the government to both continue employing Section 702 for 
its original purpose—the collection of foreign intelligence—and 
prevent the use of U.S.-person identifiers to access communica-
 
the Section 215 program. Once queries are recognized as searches, reasonable 
minds can disagree regarding what those rules should be; I defer to another 
day the difficult task of answering that question. 
 241. See supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text. 
 242. Id. 
 243. The USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 requires the government to seek 
FISC approval for any queries of telephone metadata. USA FREEDOM Act of 
2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 101, 129 Stat. 268 (2015) (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1861 (2012)). 
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tions to which it would not have lawful access in the absence of 
Section 702.  
Query-searches are not limited to the foreign intelligence 
context. Government officials of all types utilize databases to 
seek out information about U.S. persons. In fact, before even 
opening an official investigation, FBI agents are authorized to 
examine not only all FBI and Department of Justice records, 
but also “records maintained by . . . other federal, state, local, 
or tribal, or foreign governmental entities or agencies.”244 Such 
inquiries require an “authorized purpose,” but no individual-
ized suspicion.245 This authority may be used to obtain infor-
mation “on individuals, groups, or organizations of possible in-
vestigative interest,” either because they may be involved in 
crime or threats to the national security “or because they may 
be targeted for attack or victimization.”246 Thus federal agents 
have a green light to query any and all databases available to 
them about U.S. persons even in the absence of individualized 
suspicion.  
Queries of government databases by federal, state, local, or 
tribal law enforcement entities can prove just as intrusive as 
those used in the Section 215 or Section 702 programs. The 
NYPD’s DAS, for example, can track where a particular car is 
located and where it has been the past days, weeks, or months 
and it can aggregate that information with license plate infor-
mation, as well as watch lists and criminal history.247 In other 
words, it allows the police to identify connections between per-
sons, places, and things in ways that a human crime analyst 
may not have been able to do.248 Cross-referencing the federal 
government’s biometric databases with surveillance camera 
footage or photos on social media websites could provide an 
hour-by-hour account of a particular individual’s location and 
activities.249 Imagine a query compiling financial records with 
information about products with RFIDs. Such a query would 
 
 244. FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS, THE ATTORNEY GEN.’S GUIDELINES 
FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS 20 (2008). 
 245. Authorized purposes are “to detect, obtain information about, or pre-
vent or protect against federal crimes or threats to the national security or to 
collect foreign intelligence.” Id. at 19. 
 246. Id. at 17. 
 247. See Joh, supra note 11, at 48–49. 
 248. Id. 
 249. See Jennifer Lynch, FBI’s Facial Recognition Is Coming to a State 
Near You, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 2, 2012), https://www.eff.org/ 
deeplinks/2012/07/fbis_facial_recognition_coming_state_near_you. 
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indicate what one purchases and where (or to whom) it goes. 
Similarly, combining employment records with travel records 
could expose the fact that your last sick day was actually a 
three-day weekend at the beach. 
Sometimes database queries will be highly effective tools 
used to locate criminals, and this Article does not argue that 
the government should be barred from using them wholesale. 
Instead, the argument is merely that when the government us-
es a U.S.-person identifier to search aggregated information, 
that query should often qualify as a search and the Constitu-
tion should impose limits on those queries, just as it does a 
search of your home or a stop-and-frisk on the street.  
C. THE INDISPENSABILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION  
The foregoing discussion has largely focused on what the 
Constitution requires or permits. But, of course, the Constitu-
tion is not the only means of regulating government conduct. 
Many of the government’s collection techniques (as well as 
some uses) are subject to statutory, regulatory, or policy-based 
limits. Here, I explain why these existing nonconstitutional 
rules do not sufficiently address the concerns raised by query-
searches, and will not likely do so in the future. 
Those who are content to rely on legislative or regulatory 
action to impose limits on the government’s use of new technol-
ogies argue that policy makers are better suited than courts to 
determine appropriate constraints.250 Congress’s past perfor-
mance in regulating to protect privacy, however, does not sup-
port this approach. Legislative measures addressing perceived 
shortcomings in data privacy are almost universally perceived 
as outdated, incomplete, insufficiently rigorous, or some combi-
nation of the three.251 The United States lacks an overarching, 
 
 250. E.g., Kerr, supra note 121, at 857–81 (arguing that courts do not re-
spond to new technological challenges swiftly enough and that we should rely 
on the legislature to do so instead); Peter Margulies, Searching for Judicial 
Power: Article III and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (Roger Wil-
liams Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 171, 2016), https://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2827767 (arguing that Congress should be 
given deference in making decisions related to national security and evolving 
technology). But see, e.g., Swire, supra note 81, at 915–19 (expressing skepti-
cism regarding Congress’s ability to protect privacy effectively). 
 251. See, e.g., Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 36, at 1154 (“Our 
information regulatory infrastructure is disconnected, often outdated, and in-
adequate to meet the challenges of the new technologies of the Information 
Age.”). ECPA requires a warrant for collecting the contents of your e-mail, but 
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unified information protection regime. Instead, when Congress 
has acted at all, it has done so piecemeal, through a series of 
narrowly targeted statutes.252  
The USA Freedom Act of 2015 might initially paint a 
promising picture.253 After all, the FISC did impose Fourth 
Amendment–like minimization procedures on the Section 215 
program,254 the reauthorization debate as the statute ap-
proached its sunset date was intense, and Congress ended up 
codifying, in large part, the FISC’s judicially imposed limits on 
Section 215’s scope.255 Indeed, one provision in the legislation 
 
not for collecting other data stored in the cloud. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 90, 
at 1213–18.  
 252. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and 
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1430–45 (2001) 
[hereinafter Solove, Privacy and Power] (discussing the “limits of privacy law” 
and identifying flaws in multiple privacy statutes, including those protecting 
information about credit records, health, and education, as well as information 
included on drivers’ licenses and in electronic communications); Taipale, supra 
note 58, at 53–55 n.223 (comparing the piecemeal U.S. information privacy 
regime with Europe’s more comprehensive approach); Solove, Privacy and 
Power, supra, at 1440 (“Since the 1970s, Congress has grappled with the prob-
lem of databases, but has been slow to take action.”). Moreover, when statuto-
ry protections do apply, those “protections” are much less rigorous than typical 
Fourth Amendment rules, often dispensing with ex ante review or individual-
ized suspicion. Solove, Privacy and Power, supra, at 1430–45. Statutory limits 
often set a low threshold for the government to meet. E.g., Stored Communica-
tions Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012) (information must be “relevant and mate-
rial to an ongoing . . . investigation”); Id. § 2703(d) (requiring “specific and ar-
ticulable facts” (but not probable cause) giving reasonable grounds to believe 
the information will be relevant and material to an ongoing investigation). 
Most information in the hands of third parties may be acquired simply by issu-
ing a subpoena, some of which may be issued by prosecutors or law enforce-
ment officials with no prior judicial approval. E.g., id. § 3486 (administrative 
subpoenas); id. § 2709 (national security letters, which permit the FBI to get 
customer ’s telephone toll and transactional records); see also 12 U.S.C. § 3414; 
15 U.S.C. § 1681u (banking, financial, and credit information). 
 253. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (codi-
fied at 50 U.S.C. § 1861) (barring bulk collection of telephone and Internet 
metadata). As I have argued elsewhere, the USA FREEDOM Act was a shift 
in the right direction, but it did not do nearly enough. See Emily Berman, The 
Two Faces of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 91 IND. L.J. 1191 
(2016). 
 254. See supra notes 234–39 and accompanying text. 
 255. In modifying the Section 215 authorities in the USA FREEDOM Act of 
2015, Congress retained many of the limits initially imposed as minimization 
procedures by the FISC. The legislation preserved the individualized cause 
requirement by codifying the RAS standard. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(C) (to ac-
cess calling records the government must show “there is a reasonable, articu-
lable suspicion” that the seed identifier—the “special selection term” (SST) in 
the language of the statute—“is associated with” a foreign power or an agent 
of a foreign power “engaged in international terrorism”). The statute also in-
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was even more restrictive than the one the FISC required, per-
haps because some legislators argued the Constitution de-
manded it.256 Thus we had a regulatory regime that was adopt-
ed, refined in part due to constitutional concerns, and codified 
by Congress. Problem solved, right? Wrong. 
To the extent the USA Freedom Act is a success story, it is 
the exception, not the rule. As an initial matter, the prior ver-
sion of Section 215 had a sunset date. And while sunsets alone 
are not usually sufficient to force policy changes, this sunset 
provision followed closely on the heels of Edward Snowden’s 
massive leak of information about U.S. surveillance activi-
ties.257 That leak revealed that the government was interpret-
ing Section 215 of FISA in an expansive and highly controver-
sial way. In other words, the revelation of a secret program, 
targeted at Americans, and interpreting executive collection 
powers in the most aggressive way possible was enough to 
prompt Congress to restrict query-searches in that context. By 
contrast, Section 702 sunsets on December 31, 2017, yet there 
has been no public outcry objecting to the way the government 
query-searches the communications of Americans scooped up 
that program. Some legislators believe that such query-
searches violate the Fourth Amendment, but that view has not 
led to change, nor does it seem likely that it will.258  
 
cluded a particularity requirement. Id. §§ 1861(k)(4)(B), 1861(c)(2)(A) (allow-
ing collection regarding only an SST that “specifically identifies an individual, 
account, or personal device” and requiring that the FISC’s order describe “each 
specific selection term . . . with sufficient particularity to permit them to be 
fairly identified”). The statute’s ex ante review requirement differed from the 
FISC’s Section 215 minimization rules in that it requires prior review by the 
FISC itself rather than internal executive branch officials. Id. § 1861(a). 
 256. E.g., 161 CONG. REC. H2916 (daily ed. May 13, 2015) (statement of 
Rep. Nadler) (“[T]he dragnet collection without a warrant of telephone records 
. . . is the contemporary equivalent of the British writs of assistance . . . that 
the Fourth Amendment was drafted to outlaw.”); 161 CONG. REC. H2920 (daily 
ed. May 13, 2015) (statement of Rep. Jeffries) (“[E]nding bulk collection 
through section 215” was a step toward “restoring the balance” between effec-
tive national security and respect for privacy demanded by the Constitution). 
 257. See Emily Berman, The Paradox of Counterterrorism Sunset Provi-
sions, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1777 (2013) (arguing that sunsets fail to prompt 
legislative reform unless they coincide with a scandal of some kind). 
 258. E.g., 161 CONG. REC. E726-04 (2015) (statement of Rep. Sensenbren-
ner) (“Section 702 of FISA has been improperly used to obtain the content of 
Americans’ private communications without a warrant, which is unconstitu-
tional under the Fourth Amendment.”); 161 CONG. REC. H2923 (daily ed. May 
13, 2015) (statement of Rep. Sanford) (“The notion that Americans’ rights are 
contingent on the geography of where a call is directed is not consistent with 
the Constitution and highlights why [Section 702] needs to be changed.”). 
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The perfect storm that swept the USA Freedom Act into 
existence is not something we can count on happening regular-
ly. The Snowden leaks are likely a once-in-a-generation event. 
The only comparable historical event is the leak of the Penta-
gon Papers half a century ago. The Snowden leaks not only 
triggered sufficient outrage regarding Section 215 to motivate 
legislative action; they also brought to light the very existence 
of the program. If Congress or the American public are not 
aware of the way the government is using information, legisla-
tive action is impossible. Thus the FBI’s efforts to keep its use 
of Stingrays under wraps ensured that the public lacked suffi-
cient information to generate or enable opposition by legislators 
or their constituents. Nor do most people know whether and 
how their state or local law enforcement agencies employ in-
formation gathered from Stingrays, license plate readers, sur-
veillance camera footage, or other modern collection methods.  
Congress’s efforts to fill perceived statutory holes in the 
privacy regime, when they do come, have sometimes stalled in-
definitely. For years, there has been bipartisan consensus, for 
example, that the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
needs to be updated to reflect current technology.259 The Email 
Privacy Act, a reform bill, passed the House of Representatives 
419–0.260 Yet it still languishes, caught up in debate over when 
the government will be able to access information protected by 
the law.261  
Reliance on regulatory regimes imposed on query-searches 
through minimization requirements warrants similar skepti-
cism. First, foreign intelligence collection is effectively the sole 
context to which minimization requirements apply. Among all 
of the domestic law enforcement tools, only the law regulating 
wiretaps requires the government to minimize. And there, min-
imization applies only to the collection stage, rather than the 
retention, use, and dissemination stages that dominate FISA 
 
 259. James Stiven, ECPA Reform Will Protect Privacy and Meet Law En-
forcement Needs, HILL (June 2, 2016), https://www.thehill.com/blogs/pundits 
-blog/technology/281987-ecpa-reform-will-protect-privacy-meet-law 
-enforcement-needs (noting that “[f ]ew problems in recent years have drawn 
more extensive bipartisan support” than ECPA reform). 
 260. Email Privacy Act, H.R. 699, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. REP. NO. 
114-528 (2015). 
 261. Marcy Wheeler, Why Is the Government Poison-Pilling ECPA Reform?, 
EMPTYWHEEL (June 7, 2016), https://www.emptywheel.net/2016/06/07/why-is 
-the-government-poison-pilling-ecpa-reform. 
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minimization.262 Moreover, minimization in the criminal con-
text sometimes seems to be more honored in the breach, thanks 
in part to the Supreme Court’s reluctance to suppress evidence 
based on failure to minimize.263 If the Fourth Amendment ap-
plied to all query-searches, courts would be required to impose 
necessary constraints in all areas of law, not just in wiretaps 
and foreign intelligence surveillance. 
Second, minimization procedures apply only to information 
not available publicly. Depending on how broadly the concept of 
public information is construed, this could include a great deal 
of the information that the government collects under Fourth 
Amendment exemptions or purchases from third parties. Yet, 
as U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Free-
dom of the Press recognized, the aggregation of publicly availa-
ble information can be quite revealing.264 
Third, one common means of minimizing data is to strip 
out any personally identifying information.265 As more and 
more information becomes available, however, rediscovering 
the personally identifiable information, even after it has been 
stripped is relatively easy to do. Some attributes are uniquely 
identifying on their own, but more importantly any attribute 
can be identifying in combination with others. One study 
showed that by combining “public, Personal Genome Project 
profiles containing zip code, birthdate, and gender with public 
 
 262. See Berman, supra note 33, at 790–99. 
 263. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139–42 (1978) (holding that 
the failure of agents executing a wiretap warrant to make a good faith effort to 
minimize interception did not require suppression); James X. Dempsey, Com-
munications Privacy in the Digital Age: Revitalizing the Federal Wiretap Law 
To Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 65, 77 (1997) (“The minimiza-
tion requirement . . . has not been strictly enforced . . . .”); Peter J. Georgiton, 
The FBI’s Carnivore: How Federal Agents May Be Viewing Your Personal E-
mail and Why There Is Nothing You Can Do About It, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1831, 
1860 (2001) (“The [Scott] Court’s determination of what factors constitute 
‘reasonableness’ for the purposes of minimization requirements has been ap-
plied by lower courts to justify a variety of broad searches.”). 
 264. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 
489 U.S. 749, 763–64 (1989). 
 265. Personally identifiable information is  
information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s 
identity, such as their name, social security number, biometric rec-
ords, etc. alone, or when combined with other personal or identifying 
information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such 
as date and place of birth, mother ’s maiden name, etc. 
Memorandum from Clay Johnson III, Deputy Dir. for Mgmt., U.S. Office of 
Mgmt. & Budget to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies, M-07-16 n.1 (May 
22, 2007).  
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voter rolls, and mining for names hidden in attached docu-
ments, 84–97 percent of the profiles” could be accurately 
matched with a name.266 As technology advances, minimization 
practices like anonymization and data deletion that have been 
used for privacy protection in the past are not going to work be-
cause they are “increasingly easily defeated by the very tech-
niques” that are used in analyzing data.267 
Finally, another crucial difference between constitutional 
doctrine and the implementation of statutes and regulations is 
their transparency. Another lesson Edward Snowden taught us 
is that knowing the language of the statute is not always suffi-
cient to understand exactly how that statute is being imple-
mented. Rules that impact fundamental rights like privacy 
should be entirely public.268 Too often, agency interpretations, 
guidelines, targeting and minimization procedures, and other 
limits originating in the executive branch have remained se-
cret. This is not the case when it comes to judicial opinions, and 
to the extent the rules are developed by the FISC (whose deci-
sions often are classified), any statutory or constitutional inter-
pretation that court engages in also must be made public. 
Since neither statutory nor minimization-based constrains 
will successfully alleviate concerns regarding the intrusiveness 
of query-searches, Constitution-based rules must be developed. 
To be sure, such rules will impose costs and burdens on gov-
ernment agencies and officials, potentially reducing investiga-
tive efficiency. On the other hand, forcing government officials 
to target only those individuals for whom individualized suspi-
cion exists could improve efficiency, eliminating fruitless fish-
ing expeditions. More importantly, however, not all limits on 
government activity are designed to maximize efficiency. Ra-
ther, some are there to protect individual rights, even if such 
protection renders governance incrementally less efficacious.  
  CONCLUSION   
Throughout the nation’s history, changes in the technology 
to which the government has access when conducting investi-
gations have prompted adjustments in legal doctrine. Today as 
 
 266. PCAST, supra note 54, 39–40. 
 267. Id. at xi, 38. 
 268. See generally Dakota S. Rudesill, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, 7 
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 241 (2015) (arguing against the idea of secret law and in 
favor of a presumption that the rules available to the public accurately inform 
the polity of what the government is doing). 
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never before, technology has steamed ahead at a pace with 
which the law has struggled (unsuccessfully) to keep up. To-
day’s technology provides not only better versions of existing 
tools; it also provides entirely new tools, tools that do not fit 
neatly into any of our doctrinal paradigms. The government 
has gone from building profiles on individuals by seeking out 
paper files from disparate sources in various jurisdictions to 
aggregating massive amounts of data with the click of a mouse. 
This capacity to aggregate information, when combined with 
the amount of detailed information about each of our lives that 
is digitally captured and preserved, is not just a better mouse-
trap; it is a global mouse vaporizer. That is to say, it must be 
recognized as a new phenomenon, not merely a more effective 
version of an existing tool. While the phenomenon is new, the 
red flags it raises are as old as government itself. Fortunately, 
our founding document speaks not in the language of technolo-
gy but in the language of rights. And those rights must be pre-
served even in the face of an information revolution in a digital 
age. When queries of aggregated information reveals 
knowledge in which U.S. persons have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, the Fourth Amendment right to be secure in our 
persons, houses, papers, and effects is triggered just as surely 
as if the government had entered our home and physically sort-
ed through our financial, medical, familial, and associational 
records. Such queries therefore demand the same label as such 
a home invasion: search. 
